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LABELING PROGRAMS AS A
REASONABLY AVAILABLE LEAST
RESTRICTIVE TRADE MEASURE
UNDER ARTICLE XX’S NEXUS
REQUIREMENT
John J. Emslie∗
I. INTRODUCTION

P

roduct labels, as the term is used throughout this Article,
are labels placed on the outside of a product which illustrate the product’s effects on the environment or human health.1
The use of product labels by manufacturers, producers, and
packagers as a method to communicate such information is increasing in international trade. It is nearly impossible to walk
through a local store or supermarket and not see dozens of labels affixed to a variety of products. Some producers voluntarily place labels on their products to communicate the positive
effect the product may have on the environment or human life
or health, for example, “made from recycled paper.” Other producers are required to place a label on their products that warn
customers of certain dangers, for example, “this product con∗ J.D. (magna cum laude), Brooklyn Law School, 2004. I would like to
thank the Customs and International Trade Bar Association for sponsoring
the writing competition and Joshua Selig, Erin McMurray, and the entire
staff of the Brooklyn Journal of International Law for their conscientious
work. In addition, I would like to thank my parents William and Karen Emslie, my brother Jeffrey, wife Lauren and grandmother Gloria Beato for their
invaluable support. Moreover, special thanks are owed to Professor Claire R.
Kelly of Brooklyn Law School for her advice and extraordinary encouragement.
1. The term “product label” could be used to define almost every form of
communication placed on a product’s packaging, i.e. advertisements, price
tags, the ubiquitous nutritional information labels which are required on all
food fit for consumption in the United States, etc. This Article, for the sake of
brevity, limits the definition of product labels to those labels which communicate a product’s effects on the environment and human heath. Such labels are
commonly referred to as “eco-labels” and “health warnings.” Hereinafter, the
terms “labels” and “labeling programs” will exclusively refer to labels and
labeling programs which are implemented to communicate a product’s effects
on the environment or human life or health.
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tains ozone-depleting substances” or “cigarette smoke contains
carbon monoxide.” However, regardless of the message or its
impetus, product labels are likely to become an important component of international trade and international law. This Article presents the argument that product labeling programs could
become a default or catch-all reasonably available least restrictive trade measure under Article XX of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2
Part II of this Article further defines product labels and explains the three principal categories of labeling programs.
These programs are mandatory government sponsored schemes,
voluntary government sponsored schemes, and voluntary privately-sponsored schemes. Additionally, Part II demonstrates
the advantages and disadvantages of labels and labeling programs. Generally, labeling programs provide advantages to the
consumer, business and manufacturing sectors. Labeling program disadvantages include a labeling program’s potential for
abuse, the potential inconsistency and inaccuracy of labels, and
the increased costs associated with poorly-managed or regulated labeling programs.
Part III sets forth the dispute settlement mechanism of the
GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO), the forum under
which disputes involving Article XX are decided. Generally,
under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system, a complaining party requests a panel to be established to hear the dispute
and prepare a report. The panel then applies regime rules to
the facts of the dispute, which results in a binding decision that
is reviewed by the Appellate Body. Part III also explains and
provides an analysis of three major provisions of the GATT: Article I: General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment; Article III:
National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation; and,
Article XI: General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions.
2. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the exclusive organization dealing
with international trade among its Member nations. See WTO Website, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Feb.
19, 2005). Currently, there are 148 Members of the WTO. For a listing of all
Members and their date of membership, see WTO Website, at http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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Part IV analyzes Article XX of the GATT. Generally, Article
XX provides a limited exception to GATT’s default rules, which
permit a trading Member to institute a trade restriction if the
restriction is necessary to protect, inter alia, human, animal or
plant life or health, or the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources. Part IV explains the three-step Article XX analysis
established by recent GATT/WTO decisions: (1) the policy test;
(2) the nexus requirement; and (3) the chapeau. A trading
Member must satisfy each of these requirements in order to
successfully invoke an Article XX defense. The Shrimp Turtle
dispute, discussed at length in this Part, provides a perfect example of the Article XX exception analysis.
Part V focuses upon the principal GATT/WTO decisions that
have confronted the issue of product labels and labeling. The
Thai Cigarettes dispute between the United States and Thailand, the EC Asbestos dispute between Canada and the European Communities (EC), and the Tuna I dispute between the
United States and Mexico all discussed the legality and availability of labeling programs under Article XX. Each of the
situations presented was factually distinct and, therefore, the
decisions concerning the availability of a labeling program as a
least restrictive trade alternative were different in the disputes.
Part VI concludes that it may be possible for labeling programs to develop into a default or catchall least restrictive trade
measure under Article XX. However, such a labeling program
must possess certain attributes and characteristics, which are
explored in this section. For example, the labeling program
must be effective, international support or agreement must exist, and, finally, the program must be reasonably fair to all trading Members. These characteristics were developed by the
panel and Appellate Body reports discussed throughout the Article.
II. LABELING PROGRAMS
Put simply, a product label is a label placed on the outside of
a product that communicates various information about the
product, whether it be the product’s composition, production
method, or the possible effects the product has on the environ-
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ment, or human health.3 The information may be negative,
positive, or neutral. A labeling program establishes the requirements or conditions that a producer must satisfy to place a
label on the product. Labeling programs may exist on a domestic, regional, or international level. There are three major types
of labeling programs: (1) mandatory government-sponsored programs; (2) voluntary government-sponsored programs; and (3)
voluntary private-sponsored programs. Labeling programs provide advantages to both the consumer and business and manufacturing sectors. However, the proliferation of labeling programs has resulted in some well-founded criticisms as well.
Specifically, if not adequately monitored and regulated, labeling
programs present the potential for abuse, labels may be inconsistent and inaccurate, and producers fear the increased costs
associated with labeling programs.
A. Defining Labels and Labeling Programs
Product labels are typically labels placed on the outside of a
product that contain information concerning the product’s potential effect on the environment, human, animal or plant life.4
However, labels may also be affixed to products in an effort to
pursue other socially-conscious goals, such as the eradication of
child labor.5 Environmental labels, which are gaining popularity, are labels that communicate the product's interaction with
the environment.6 These labels communicate to the consumer
3. Matthias Vogt, Environmental Labelling and Certification Schemes: A
Modern Way to Green the World or GATT/WTO – Illegal Trade Barrier?, 33
ENVTL. L. REP. 10522 (2003). See also Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrier or Trade
Boon? A Critical Evaluation of Environmental Labeling and its Role in the
“Greening” of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 206–20 (1996) (discussing the use of labels to warn consumers about human health and environmental issues, production methods, and the effects of the product on plant
and animal species).
4. Atsuko Okubo, Environmental Labeling Programs and the GATT/WTO
Regime, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 599, 601 (1999).
5. See Janelle M. Diller & David A. Levy, Child Labor, Trade and Investment: Toward the Harmonization of International Law, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 663,
680 (1997) (discussing GATT and the potential use of product labeling in the
context of child labor). See also discussion of RUGMARK, infra notes 19–24
and accompanying text.
6. Teresa Hock, Note, The Role of Eco-labels in International Trade: Can
Timber Certification be Implemented as a Means to Deforestation?, 12 COLO. J.
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that use of the product may adversely effect the environment or,
conversely, that the product is more friendly to the environment
than its competitors’.7
Labels are not basic standard requirements for products. Instead, basic standards are the minimum requirements for a
product being commercialized in a given country.8 Conversely,
labeling programs do not pose “internal requirements” on the
product (i.e., the minimum composition and/or ingredients the
product must contain for it to be sold to the public), but rather
impose an “external requirement” (i.e., a requirement as to
which information must be contained on the label).
One common category of product labels, environmental labels,
has become more prominent in the United States and Europe
where consumers have expressed greater concern about the effects that industrialization and consumption patterns have on
the environment.9 The information usually communicated to
the consumer on an environmental label is that the particular
product is, for example, more environmentally friendly than
other products in the same category.10 For example, a label that
explains that the product contains organically-grown ingredients conveys the message that such a product is more environmentally friendly than products that use pesticides and other
chemical treatments.
Environmental labels often transmit messages to consumers
that promote the consumption and production of alternative
products that are more environmentally friendly than products
currently used by the market.11 For example, a label may be
placed on reusable canvas shopping bags that explains that the
INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 347, 350 (2001) (noting the increased popularity of
environmental labels among countries, especially in Japan, Canada, and in
Europe).
7. Markku Lehtonen, Criteria in Environmental Labelling: A Comparative Analysis of Environmental Criteria in Selected Labelling Schemes, United
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), 13 ENV’T AND TRADE 7 (1997)
(citing the UNCTAD Ad hoc Working Group on Trade, Environment and Development’s definition of environmental labeling).
8. See Henrique Freire de Oliveira Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A
Need for International Regulation, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 163
(2000).
9. Lehtonen, supra note 7, at 8.
10. Id. at 10.
11. Okubo, supra note 4, at 601.
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use of such bags is more environmentally friendly than the use
of paper or plastic bags currently used by grocery stores. Thus,
the producer, through use of a label, could either attempt to set
itself apart from its own product class (i.e., with the use of a
biodegradable container) or it can promote the environmentally
friendly aspects of the entire class versus another class of products (i.e., canvas bags versus paper and plastic bags). Therefore, the most proper definition is a “catchall,” one that defines
labels and labeling programs as a “range of labels” used to
communicate information about a product to the consumer.12
Labeling programs exist on a domestic, international, or regional level. An example of a domestic labeling program is the
dolphin-safe label on tuna and tuna products in the United
States.13 A typical international labeling program is that established by the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO).14 The ISO is a network of national standards institutes
from 147 countries, working in partnership with international
organizations, governments, industry, business, and consumer
representatives.15 The ISO provides standards and guidelines
for environmental labeling.16 These guidelines are typically referred to as ELP.17 In addition, various United Nations Conferences have directly supported labeling programs.18
12. Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development
(FIELD), Briefing Paper: Legal and Policy Issues in the Market Access Implications of Labelling for Environmental Purposes, Sub-Regional Brainstorming
Workshop (Asia) - Specific Trade and Environment Issues in Paragraphs 31
and 32 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration in Preparation for the Cancun
WTO Ministerial Conference, 4 (July 30, 2003 – Aug. 1, 2003) [hereinafter
FIELD Briefing Paper] (discussing environmental labels in particular).
13. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §1385
(1990). This act specifies the labeling standard for any tuna product exported
from or offered for sale in the United States.
14. See generally ISO Website, at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/ISOOnline.open
erpage (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
15. Id.
16. Doris Gaskell Nuyda, Eco-labeled Goods Will Soon be in Local Markets,
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Apr. 25, 2003. ISO 14000 contains International
Standards for Environmental Management. See ISO Website, ISO 14000, at
http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/iso9000-14000/iso14000/iso14000index.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2004).
17. Nuyda, supra note 16.
To obtain an ELP certification, a company or manufacturer must first
apply to the ELP administrator who processes the forms and ar-
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An example of a regional labeling program would be the
RUGMARK program.19 RUGMARK is a nonprofit organization
that works to end child labor and offers educational opportunities for children in Nepal, India and Pakistan.20 RUGMARK
recruits producers and importers of carpets to make and sell
carpets that are free from illegal child labor.21 Producers agree
to adhere to RUGMARK’s strict no child-labor guidelines and
permit random inspections of carpet looms. In doing so,
RUGMARK grants the producers the right to place the
RUGMARK label on their carpets. RUGMARK contends that
this system provides the best assurance that children were not
employed in the making of the carpet.22 In addition, a portion of
the carpet price is contributed to the rehabilitation and education of former child weavers.23
The RUGMARK labeling program is very similar to environmental and health-related labeling programs in that it shares
similar implementation, influence, philosophy, and underlying
ranges the site visiting and product testing by technical experts. If
the experts’ assessment is favorable, the ELP administrator then declares the product as having passed. The ELP board gives it approval
and the label or certification is awarded to the applicant. It takes
about two months to process applications.
Id.
18. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT, at 38–39, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), U.N.
Sales No. E.93.I.8 (1993). Chapter 4(B)(c) related to assisting individuals and
households in making environmentally sound purchasing decisions states:
4.21 Governments, in cooperation with industry and other relevant
groups, should encourage expansion of environmental labeling and
other environmentally related product information programmes designed to assist consumers to make informed choices.
4.22 They should also encourage the emergence of an informed consumer public and assist individuals and households to make environmentally informed choices by ... (b) Making consumers aware of
the health and environmental impact of products, through such
means as consumer legislation and environmental labelling.
Id.
19. See generally RUGMARK Foundation, at http://www.rugmark.org (last
visited Jan. 21, 2005).
20. See RUGMARK Foundation, About RUGMARK, at http://www.rugm
ark.org/about.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
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“socially friendly” intention. First, with its similarities to environmental and health-related labeling programs, its ingenuity
and success reinforces the argument of the need for a cohesive
and standardized labeling program.24 Second, it demonstrates
that worldwide acceptance of labeling programs and their potential international success makes labeling programs applicable not only to the protection of the environment and human
health, but also to other important objectives such as human
rights and various other socially friendly goals. Therefore, it is
possible that in the future successful labeling programs may be
extended to a wealth of other causes, where demand shifts generated by socially conscious consumers having access to the information contained on the labels can affect the supply of other
socially friendly products to the detriment of socially unfriendly
products.
The goals of a labeling program are fairly straightforward.
Generally, the purpose of a labeling program is to increase demand for environmentally friendly or more health-conscious
products with the hope that the products will gain a larger
market share.25 The labels placed on tuna and tuna products

24. It has been documented that RUGMARK inspectors rescue, on average,
one child carpet weaver per week, and RUGMARK is viewed internationally
as a model program for the eradication of child labor. Press Release, National
Consumers League, NCL to U.S. Retailers: Stop Ignoring Child Slaves in Carpet Industry (Mar. 26, 2001), available at http://www.nclnet.org/news/2001/
carpet_child_labor.htm (outlining RUGMARK’s success story.)
25. See Staffin, supra note 3, at 209:
While there are many different types of environmental labeling
schemes, they all share a common goal: to identify for the consumer
those products that are environmentally less harmful than other
competing goods within the same product category, either because of
their ingredients, the PPMs by which they were generated, or both,
so that the consumer will become motivated to purchase only these
‘green’ goods, thereby increasing the ‘green’ producer’s market share
to the detriment of its competitors.
Id.
PPMs are “Processing and Production Methods.” They “concern the
way in which products are manufactured or processed and natural resources
are extracted or harvested, and are often the basis for national regulations.”
Elizabeth Barham, What’s in a Name?: Eco-Labelling in the Global Food System, Paper Presented at the Joint Meetings of the Agriculture, Food, and Human Values Society and the Association for the Study of Food and Society,
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are a perfect illustration of this technique and its success. Although the American embargo on Mexican tuna was lifted in
1999 in response to the GATT panel’s decision in the Tuna I
dispute,26 since U.S. law prevents Mexican tuna from being labeled Dolphin Safe, virtually no retailer in the United States
will stock it.27 In addition, labeling programs hope that providing certain information to the public will “serve as a normative
process to influence and shape international behavior over time,
with a goal of sustainable development.”28
Therefore, labeling programs are usually designed to achieve
four basic goals: “(i) to improve the sale or image of the labelled
product; (ii) to raise the environmental [or health-conscious]
awareness of consumers; (iii) to provide accurate and timely
information for consumers to make informed judgments; and,
(iv) to direct manufacturers to account for the … impact of their
products.”29 However, the manner in which these labeling programs meet these goals and the compliance level attributed to
each of these programs depends on the way in which these programs are structured.
B. Types of Labeling Programs
To date, there are at least thirty different labeling programs
implemented in forty different countries worldwide, each bearing its own, sometimes intriguing, name.30 Germany’s is called
Blue Angel, Japan’s program is Eco Mark, Canada’s is Environmental Choice, and, in the United States, it is Green Seal.31
The degree of governmental oversight and regulation varies
from country to country and among organizations.32 There are
held in Madison, Wisconsin, June 5–8 (1997), available at http://www.pmac.
net/bbarham.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
26. For a full discussion of the Tuna I dispute, including the panel’s decision, see infra notes 180–194 and accompanying text.
27. See Tangled Nets, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2003, at 38. This fact is
especially interesting considering that tuna demand is increasing worldwide.
Id.
28. Okubo, supra note 4, at 601.
29. FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 5.
30. Nuyda, supra note 16.
31. Id.
32. For example, sometimes environmental labels are based on a tool
known as a life cycle assessment (LCA), which is a “method in which the environmental effects of a particular product are evaluated by analysis of the in-
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three main categories of labeling programs: (1) mandatory government-sponsored schemes; (2) voluntary governmentsponsored schemes; and (3) voluntary private-sponsored
schemes.33
1. Mandatory Government-Sponsored Schemes
Under a mandatory government-sponsored scheme, producers
are required to attach labels to their products which convey either the negative, neutral, or positive contents or effects of their
products.34
The primary purpose of a program requiring the labeling of
negative content is to warn consumers of the adverse effect such
a product may have on human health or the environment. The
aspirations of such a program are to persuade manufacturers to
switch to a more “friendly” or “healthy” process or, instead, have
the consumer avoid the product altogether and find an alternative.35 One example of such a scheme is the U.S. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990.36 The amendments were made in response to the highly successful Montreal Protocol37 and were
intended to get the United States in compliance with the Protocol. The Clean Air Act requires:
the labeling of any product that contains or was manufactured
with certain chemical substances known to deplete the stratospheric ozone layer....The required label must read: “Warning:
Contains [or Manufactured with] [name of substance], a sub-

puts and outputs of materials and energy and other important factors related
to the product.” FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 5. Although not all
programs apply a comprehensive LCA, the recent trend supports its inclusion
or a similar technique. Id. at 5–6.
33. Okubo, supra note 4, at 603.
34. Id.
35. See Staffin, supra note 3, at 211.
36. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. 101–549, Title VI, § 602(a), 104 Stat. 2649
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7671 (1994), available at
http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/title6.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
37. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987) (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1989). The purpose of the Montreal Protocol was to eliminate substances that cause ozone depletion by instituting a total phase out of
such products. See id. pmbl.
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stance which harms public health and the environment by de38
stroying ozone in the upper atmosphere.”

The primary purpose of a neutral labeling program is to provide consumers with information that is not necessarily negative or positive, but would be considered valuable information to
the consumer in his or her decision making. The label is neutral because the information provided may not be sufficiently
material to generate a negative or positive response per se. For
example, in the United States, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) requires car manufacturers to place a sticker on
the window of a new automobile stating the fuel economy the
consumer can expect from the car.39
The positive type of labeling program allows a producer to
place a label on the product illustrating the product’s positive
feature, as compared to other products in the same category.
An example of this program is the labeling of tuna and tuna
products in the United States.40 This label allows the producer
to communicate the lengths taken to ensure that the product
was produced with positive environmental intention. Although
these products often cost more than products that do not bear
the label, the seller is hoping to “cash in” on the environmentally or health conscious segment of the market, thereby gaining an economic advantage.41
2. Voluntary Government-Sponsored Labeling Schemes
Voluntary government-sponsored labeling schemes vary
greatly in content.42 These programs involve government participation in the formation, administration, and sometimes fi-

38. Staffin, supra note 3, at 211–12 (discussing the Clean Air Act).
39. Fuel Economy Regulations for 1977 and Later Model Year Automobiles
—Labeling, 40 C.F.R. § 600.307-95 (1994).
40. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385
(1990).
41. Okubo, supra note 4, at 601 (explaining that where consumers’ environmental awareness is well developed, labeling programs should create demand pressures in favor of environmentally friendly products). See also
FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 8 (stating that “the potential for
growth in the market share of eco-labeled products makes eco-labeling a compelling marketing tool”).
42. Okubo, supra note 4, at 605.
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nancing of the program43 without creating the “adversarial posture of the mandatory requirements” because peer and public
pressure are the only factors for the producer to consider.44 One
example of this type of program is the German Blue Angel program, which is credited as being the world’s first environmental
labeling program.45
Launched in 1977 to promote more environmentally-sound
products, Blue Angel is administered by the German government through three bodies: the Federal Environmental Agency
(FEA), the Environmental Label Jury (ELJ), and the Institute
for Quality Assurance and Labeling (RAL).46
47

The FEA performs a streamlined LCA in order to determine
which stages of the product’s life cycle results in the most significant environmental impacts. The FEA next drafts criteria
regarding these significant impacts, which are to be met by recipients of the ‘Blue Angel’ award. It forwards these criteria to
the [RAL] for review. RAL ... then convenes a panel of experts, drawn from manufacturing, environmental, consumer,
and union groups to critique the draft criteria. It then forwards this critique to the ELJ, which possesses the final authority on whether to approve the new set of ecolabeling criteria. In the past, the ELJ has approved between three to six
new eco-label categories each year. This entire process of
establishing a new eco-label can last from between six months
48
to two years.

Another example of a voluntary government sponsored program is a so-called “seal of approval.” In such a program, the
government, or an institution closely connected to the government, gives compliant products a government “seal of approval”
43. FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 6 (explaining that government
involvement would help to “ensure consistency of criteria, balance of views of
different parties, greater accountability to the public and greater transparency”).
44. Okubo, supra note 4, at 605.
45. FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 6 n.16.
46. Id.
47. For a definition of LCA, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
48. Staffin, supra note 3, at 225 (internal citations omitted). For a more
detailed discussion of the German Blue Angel program, see OECD, ECOLABELLING: ACTUAL EFFECTS OF SELECTED PROGRAMMES 25–27 (1997), available
at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/linkto/ocde-gd(97)105 (last visited
Jan. 30, 2005).
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or other similar positive label.49 Both the German Blue Angel
program and other similar seals of approval garner more credibility than voluntary privately-sponsored programs discussed
below.50
3. Voluntary Private-Sponsored Labeling Programs
The voluntary private-sponsored labeling program is a newlydeveloping area.51 This type of program is significant because it
does not require the support of individual governments, and
thus, should not conflict with GATT/WTO rules. This is so because GATT/WTO rules are normally understood to cover only
state activities.52 These programs do not involve government
oversight or participation, as they are either administered by a
third party or based on self assessment, i.e. a declaration by the
manufacturers themselves.53
One example of such a program is Green Seal in the United
States.54 Green Seal is an independent non-profit organization
that identifies and endorses products and services that cause
less toxic pollution and waste, conserve resources and habitats,
and minimize global warming and ozone depletion.55 On the
basis of proposals made by industry and the public, Green Seal
selects product categories for its program based on a number of
factors including: significance of environmental impact, the opportunity for its reduction, public interest, manufacturer interest and promotional opportunity.56
49. Okubo, supra note 4, at 605.
50. Id. at 605–07 (discussing the advantages of government involvement).
51. Id. at 607.
52. Id. at 609. The author goes on to note that some arguments remain as
to state responsibility for the activities of private groups. Id.
53. FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 6–7 (explaining that typically
voluntary privately-sponsored labeling programs receive no government sponsorship, funding or assistance and are typically made without third party
certification or investigation).
54. See Green Seal Website, About Green Seal, at http://www.greenseal.
org/about.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004).
55. Id.
56. See OECD, supra note 48, at 28. Green Seal’s specific programs include: (1) Greening Your Government (technical assistance to all levels of government in their purchasing, operations, and facilities management); (2)
Product Standards and Certification (development of environmental standards for leadership products in specific categories and certification of prod-
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One attribute that all three types of labeling programs share
is their common advantages and disadvantages. However, the
level of compliance and regulation associated with each type of
program may help to alleviate some of the disadvantages present in all labeling programs.
C. Advantages of Labeling Programs
The following is a list of the possible advantages of a labeling
program. The advantages can be broken down into the following sections: (a) advantages to the consumer; (b) advantages to
business and manufacturing; and (c) advantages to the environment or human health.
1. Advantages to the Consumer
Perhaps the most obvious advantage to the consumer is
heightened consumer awareness.57 For example, consider labels
on alcoholic beverages that warn a pregnant consumer that
consumption of the product could adversely affect the pregnancy. Likewise, environmental labels provide an environmentally-conscious consumer with the necessary information to
make an informed decision. Labels may be a powerful tool to
express the health or environmental component of a product, so
much so that certain producers may fear the requirement of a
label.58 However, many critics argue that it may be difficult for
the consumer to determine whether statements on a product

ucts that meet them); (3) Product Recommendations (technical reports called
Choose Green Reports on products in a variety of categories giving specific
brand recommendations of those that meet screening criteria); (4) Greening
the Lodging Industry (long-term project with hotels and motels to green their
operations and purchasing and includes certification of specific properties);
and (5) Policy (leadership in green procurement policy, international policy for
environmental labeling, etc.). See About Green Seal, supra note 54.
57. See Staffin, supra note 3, at 215.
58. For example, company documents produced during toxic tort litigation
involving the W.R. Grace insulating product Monokote revealed that the company knew in 1977 that the product contained low levels of a rare form of
asbestos called tremolite. Grace chose not to label the product or otherwise
inform customers out of fear that labeling would severely dampen sales of the
product. Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and Causation to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 36 (2001).

File: Emslie MACRO 03.13.05.doc

2005]

Created on: 3/14/2005 9:27 AM

Last Printed: 3/14/2005 4:30 PM

LABELING PROGRAMS

499

are truthful.59 It is possible that a consumer may mistake a label on a product as an advertising ploy or attention grabber.
This concern emphasizes the need for a supervised governmental program, independent third-party oversight, or expert assessment techniques that are able to provide the consumer with
the necessary verification.60
2. Advantages to Business and Manufacturing
Labeling may create greater efficiency for manufacturers.61
Companies that are forced to meet the requirements of a label
either through government regulation or market pressures will
feel pressure to comply with the standards to compete in the
marketplace. Such companies will be forced to invest in cleaner
or safer technologies which may, in turn, increase production,
efficiency, and profitability. In addition, companies that earn
the reputation of being more “green” or healthy than others will
likely enjoy greater sales, customer loyalty, and consideration.62
3. Advantages to the Environment
Unsurprisingly, the environmental advantage is perhaps the
main goal of an environmental program; the same is true for a
labeling program that seeks to reduce potential negative effects
on human health.63 Labeling provides the opportunity to differ59. See George Richards, Note, Environmental Labeling of Consumer
Products: The Need for International Harmonization of Standards Governing
Third-Party Certification Programs, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 235, 247
(1994) (arguing that, “consumers are unable to determine the truthfulness of
whether a product is, for example ‘ozone friendly.’ Verification of such a claim
is beyond the capacity of the typical consumer.”).
60. See id. (noting that the result of an “objective verification is a reduction
of the information gathering cost to the consumer, which translates into
greater use and acceptance of the program by consumers and a greater demand for the products”).
61. Id. at 247–48.
62. See Okubo, supra note 4, at 601, 602–03 (explaining that many producers use labels to gain a competitive advantage through their green image,
especially where environmental awareness is high). See also Richards, supra
note 59, at 238 n.16, 17 (citing surveys that place the percentage of “green”
consumers as 82% to 90% of the total population and noting the significant
impact of “green labeling” on the production and advertising of products).
63. For a discussion of the purposes and goals of a labeling program see
supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
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entiate products that are produced in a healthier or more environmentally-sound way from those that are not,64 perhaps without even violating the rules of the WTO.65 A labeling program
may avoid violating WTO rules because labeling programs are
often regarded as a less restrictive trade measure than traditional legislative and administrative policy instruments and
“[g]overnments tend to support these schemes because labeling
provides incentives for producers to lessen the environmental
[or health] impact of their products without establishing binding restrictions or direct bans on products.”66 For example, successful environmental labeling protects the environment in two
ways. First, it assures that the labeled products are more environmentally-friendly than could be expected without the label,
and second, it gives environmentally-concerned consumers the
ability to avoid products with negative environmental impacts.67
Some argue that labeling programs aim to help improve the
environment “in each country by reducing the pollution that
unconcerned, non-compliant companies might otherwise
cause.”68
A labeling program’s success hinges on its ability to use its
greatest characteristic: its ability to attack the use of damaging
products from the demand side of the market. Shifts in demand
will create a competitive incentive to suppliers and manufacturers to raise the level of environmental quality of their products.69 Hopefully, such shifts will lead directly to less environmental damage or decreased medical costs. By addressing the

64. Anna Henriksen, Voluntary Environmental Labelling and the World
Trade Organisation, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CHRISTIAN FRISS BACH 3 (Nov. 9, 1998), available at
WITH
http://www.econ.ku.dk/cfb/trade/papers/henriksen.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2005).
65. Id. at 5. A country with high environmental demands may legislate for
its domestic industry, ensuring that domestic products are produced in an
environmentally sound way. However, the domestic products face competition
with imported products that may have been produced in a more polluting
manner. In the WTO, the country is not allowed to differentiate between the
foreign and domestic products when the characteristics of the products are the
same. Id.
66. Okubo, supra note 4, at 602.
67. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 2.
68. Nuyda, supra note 16.
69. Richards, supra note 59, at 248.
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demand side, labeling cannot be overruled by suppliers, largely
because labeling programs use market mechanisms.70 Market
mechanisms and demand shifts are especially important because “protection measures addressing the supply side are often
overruled by lobbying.”71
D. Labeling Disadvantages
A labeling program has potential disadvantages if not administered properly. These disadvantages include: (a) its potential
for abuse as a restrictive trade measure, which serves as a
source of continuing debate between developed and developing
nations; (b) a label’s potential inconsistency and inaccuracy; and
(c) fear among producers that labeling programs may be too
costly to implement.
1. The Debate between Developing Countries’ and Developed
Countries’ Labeling Programs and their Potential for Abuse
When Used as Restricted Trade Measures
The debate between the principal of uninhibited free trade
and a nation’s right to protect the health of its citizenry and
environment has revealed sharp distinctions between the positions of developed and developing countries.72 Developed countries enjoy a higher per capita standard of living than developing countries.73 Due to a greater amount of disposable income,
citizens in developed countries can choose between different
products. Recognizing this ability, “developed countries have
been prone to utilize (or at least threaten to utilize) trade
measures, such as import bans, in order to cause producers in
developing countries to change their environmentally harmful
PPMs74 to more benign methods.”75 However, developing coun70. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 6. See also Staffin, supra note 3, at 210
(stating that “eco-labeling schemes attempt to marshall the forces of consumer
demand in order to effect environmentally beneficial changes on the supply
side”).
71. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 5.
72. See Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment: Some North-South Considerations, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J 591 (1994).
73. See Staffin, supra note 3, at 207 (noting that while their standard of
living is high, developed nations have recently become conscious of the devastating environmental harm caused by unfettered economic growth).
74. For a definition of PPMs, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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tries see this use of trade measures “as a unilateral attempt to
export the [developed country’s] domestic environmental laws,
which may be appropriate for the [developed country’s] … level
of industrial development, but which are too restrictive for …
[the developing] countries.”76 Developing countries view these
trade restrictions as an unfair attempt to punish them for environmental damage that was arguably caused by the developed
countries themselves.77 Additionally, developing countries argue that such restrictions are “protectionist, discriminatory,
and in violation of their sovereign rights to develop and exploit
their own resources.”78
These arguments have some import. Labeling requirements
set forth by a protectionist country can be abused as a non-tariff
trade barrier in numerous ways.79 For example, criteria can be
designed to favor the domestic production, application procedures for compliance with the label program can be made exceedingly difficult for foreign producers, or the choice of product
category can be heavily influenced by local industries’ needs.80
However, developing countries are equally concerned with ensuring that labels will not become yet another restrictive business practice which further limits market access for their products. After all, many national economies of developing countries depend greatly upon the export earnings with which to pay
for food imports and social services.81
2. The Potential Inconsistency and Inaccuracy of Labels
Labels can send a dubious message. Some labels currently in
use may not clearly communicate the harm the product or process is seeking to avoid or the protection the product offers.
Consider, for example, labels that encourage consumers to buy
locally.82 One could walk the aisles of a local grocery store’s
75. Staffin, supra note 3, at 208.
76. Id.
77. See DANIEL C. ESTY, INST. FOR INT’L ECON., GREENING THE GATT:
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 182 (1994).
78. Staffin, supra note 3, at 208.
79. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 7.
80. Id.
81. Barham, supra note 25.
82. See id. For example, such labels may be used by local farmers to attract sales.
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produce department and see these labels affixed to a variety of
goods, including farm produce. One argument is that such purchases might reduce the environmental costs of excess pollution
that accompany the additional transportation of the produce
shipped from greater distances. However, these labels may
have other connotations than simply escaping the pollution associated with transportation.83 They can be used to support
local business and, therefore, stymie other domestic or foreign
goods. Without government checks and qualification assessments on these labeling techniques, the messages sent by producers are, at least, dubious and, at worst, worthless. Of
course, the level of regulation of the truth and accuracy of the
label may depend on who, in fact, sponsors the labeling program. If it is a government-sponsored labeling program,84 then
it stands to reason that the government would regulate the
truth and accuracy of the label. If it is a voluntary privatelysponsored program,85 then the industry, trade group, or nongovernmental organization (NGO) sponsor of the program
would regulate the label’s truth and accuracy.
It has been argued that some labels are ineffective because
they are susceptible to abuse by manufacturers who may deceive customers into thinking that a product is safer than it is.86
Additionally, environmentally-friendly production is rarely the
cheapest method and it often requires a higher price.87 Moreover, an additional argument which supports the conclusion
that labels are ineffective is that “labelling is not an effective
instrument in guiding the consumers to choose between products that belong to different categories, but serve the same purpose,” i.e., “rechargeable batteries in comparison with nonrechargeable.”88 Therefore, in such a situation, it may be difficult for a producer to significantly increase its market share.

83. See id. The reasons supported for buying locally often reference nonmarket, non-commodifiable values of a social or ethical basis as well as ecological. Id.
84. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
85. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
86. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 2 (discussing single issue labels).
87. Id at 3. The reward for this process is that the label may give the
product a marketing advantage, which hopefully offsets the higher price. Id.
88. Id.
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3. Fear Among Producers Could Inhibit a Labeling Regime from
Coming to Fruition
Labels provoke fears among producers.89 This fear stems partially from the producer’s concern that it may be unable to comply economically with a mandatory labeling scheme which will
result in a loss of market share.90 Needless to say, a change of
procedure or production method requires a tremendous amount
of capital expenditures. In addition, this fear and concern could
create tension between NGOs and producers.91 If the birth of an
international label regime is in the near future, this tension
may result in the granting of too many concessions by label
supporters to the arguably more powerful producers, which
may, in turn, give rise to the hasty adoption of an ineffective
regime.
This situation is compounded by the unbalanced level of bargaining power between the collectively strong producers and the
relatively weak label supporters. A successful labeling program
would require tremendous support from the producers themselves.92 The producers must have faith that the investments
required to meet the labeling requirements will pay off in the
market. However, risk-averse producers will fear the significant up-front costs and worry that the label will not have its
intended effect. In addition, a producer’s decision to join a labeling program may quell other possible innovation which necessarily will be foregone to satisfy the labeling program’s requirements. Research and development for other solutions may
cease so that the company can focus all attention on being a
leader in its label program. In addition, in the case of environmental labeling, the “label requires good marketing when introduced in order to gain credibility. The label has no effect if the
consumers do not consider it a guarantee for an environmentally-friendly product.”93
In order to fully understand how these programs will interact
with the GATT rules, specifically Article XX, it is first necessary
89. Freire de Oliveira Souza, supra note 8, at 164.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 164–65.
92. See Richards, supra note 59, at 250 (discussing the lack of industry
support).
93. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 6.
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to set forth the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism and
the major provisions of the GATT. This discussion is necessary
because Article XX is used as a defense to the following rules
and the validity of the Article XX defense is usually determined
within the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
III. GATT/WTO LAW AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
A. The Dispute Settlement Mechanism Under the World Trade
Organization
One of the problems with the status quo of reconciling free
trade with environmental or human health measures that may
restrict free trade is that the WTO has the only worldwide
mandatory and binding dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, because they often incite trade measures, unresolved environmental conflicts have great potential for facing a WTO
panel.94 This problem lies in the fact that environmental conflicts are often resolved by trade experts on WTO panels who
may not be sufficiently educated in environmental or human
health related issues to resolve disputes concerning them.95 Because, for better or worse, such disputes will often end up before
the dispute resolution machinery of the WTO, it is imperative
that this Article set out the dispute settlement procedures under the WTO.
Before the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,96 the dispute settlement mechanism of the GATT was not binding. It
was not until the establishment of the WTO and the creation of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that decisions
were binding.97 The DSU is administered by the Dispute Set94. Laura Yavitz, The WTO and the Environment: The Shrimp Case that
Created a New World Order, 16 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 203, 203
(2001–2002).
95. See Shane Spelliscy, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: A
Chink in the Armor, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 155 (2001), citing M.C.W.
Pinto, The Court and Other International Tribunals, in INCREASING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUIUM TO CELEBRATE THE 50 ANNIVERSARY OF THE COURT
280, 295 (Connie Peck & Roy S. Lee eds., 1997).
96. The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations resulted in the establishment of the World Trade Organization. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2.
97. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
TH

File: Emslie MACRO 03.13.05.doc

506

Created on: 3/14/2005 9:27 AM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 3/14/2005 4:30 PM

[Vol. 30:2

tlement Body.98 First, the parties to the dispute are encouraged
to solve the dispute between themselves.99 If a solution cannot
be reached between the parties, the complaining party may request that a panel be established to complete a report.100 The
panel will apply the regime rules to the dispute and set forth an
appropriate decision.101 If requested, the Appellate Body will
review legal appeals from the panel’s decision.102 The panel consists of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental
individuals, including persons who have served on or presented
a case to a panel, or have served as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to the GATT, or have served as a
representative to the Council of Committee of any covered
agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat,
or have taught or published on international trade law or policy, or have served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.103 During the interim review stage, the panel shall issue a
report to both parties.104 Upon completion of this report three
things may happen: (1) the parties can appeal the report, in
which case the DSB would await the decision of the Appellate
Body;105 (2) the report is adopted at a DSB meeting;106 or (3) the
DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.107
The losing party to the trade dispute is provided three options
under the DSU: (1) it can bring the measure found to be inconsistent with the Agreement into compliance or otherwise comply
Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, vol. 27, art. 17.14, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] (providing
that an Appellate Body report must be “unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute”).
98. See id. art. 2.
99. Id. art. 4.
100. Id. art. 6.
101. Id. arts. 6, 11
102. Id.
103. Id. art. 8
104. Id. art. 15.
105. Id. art. 17.
106. Id. art. 16.4.
107. Id. However, this result is unlikely to happen because of the danger
that it poses to the legitimacy of the dispute settlement system. See Antonio
Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 23 YALE
J. INT’L L. 301, 341 n.168 (1998). See also Bal Gopal Das, Intellectual Property
Dispute, GATT, WIPO: Of Playing by the Game Rules and Rules of the Game,
35 IDEA 149, 169 n.128 (1994).
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with the recommendations and ruling within the reasonable
period of time determined; (2) it may enter into negotiations
with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation; or (3) if no satisfactory agreement on compensation is
reached within a reasonable time period, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend any concessions entered under
the covered agreements.108
However, the DSU promotes
“prompt compliance” to ensure effective resolution of disputes to
the benefit of all members.109
B. GATT/WTO Provisions and Laws
This Article discusses the Article XX exception to the
GATT/WTO rules and its application to labeling programs.
However, to fully understand Article XX’s application with respect to labeling programs, it is first necessary to understand
how it interacts with other GATT/WTO rules. Article XX is invoked by a WTO Member as a defense to that Member’s challenged trade restriction.110 Therefore, it is essential to provide a
background explaining the challenges which may be brought by
an “attacking” Member who is claiming that a trade restriction
is being imposed on them by the “defensive” Member who has
imposed the trade restriction. Defensive Members will invoke
the Article XX exception. It is also important to note that the
provision which Article XX is intended to shelter may perhaps
be a violation of one of the following provisions and rules. However, as long as the trade restriction is acceptable under Article
XX, meaning the least restrictive trade measure necessary to
satisfy the protected policy covered under Article XX, it will be
permitted under GATT/WTO rules.111
108. See DSU, supra note 97, art. 22.2.
109. See id. art. 21.1. See also Claire R. Kelly, The Value Vacuum: Self Enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop, 22 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 673, 705 (2001) (arguing that the “DSU explicitly states that compliance is preferred”).
110. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 533 (4th
ed. 2002) (explaining the proper analysis of an Article XX “defense”).
111. See infra Part IV discussing Article XX.
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1. Article I: General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
Article I, often considered the cornerstone of the GATT,112
provides that:
[With] respect to customs and duties and charges of any kind
imposed on, or in connection with, importation or exportation
or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports ... any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the territories of all other Contracting Par113
ties.

Essentially, Article I requires “that in the administration of
their tariffs and other regulations relating to trade in goods,
WTO members [must] not discriminate between their trading
partners; [and must] accord each other most-favored-nation
(MFN) status.”114 Thus, for example, all members must pay the
same custom duties or be subject to the same regulations as the
MFN.115
2. Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and
Regulation
Custom duties or “tariffs” are covered by Article I and thus,
are not covered by Article III. However, other types of taxes are
covered by Article III.116 Article III sets forth the principle of
“National Treatment,” which provides that a country may not
discriminate against imported products via use of an internal
tax or other internal measure.117 Thus, Article III prohibits internal taxes, as well as internal charges, laws and regulations,
and other requirements that may affect the sale of the product
in the country. Article III:2 provides, in relevant part, that
“the products of the territory of any contracting party imported
112. See, e.g., ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 481
(2d ed. 1999).
113. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. I.
114. SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 112, at 481.
115. Yavitz, supra note 94, at 209.
116. Id.
117. Id.

THE
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into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be
subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”118 While Article III:4 concerns
differential treatment of all laws, regulations, and requirements, and provides, in relevant part, “the products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin
in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting
their internal sale… .”119
One example of a WTO panel report and subsequent Appellate Body decision that addressed Article III is the Gasoline
Case.120 In the Gasoline Case, the United States imposed a
measure which prohibited the sale of conventional gasoline in
metropolitan areas and only permitted the sale of reformulated
gasoline in an effort to reduce the pollution caused by conventional gasoline.121 The U.S. law provided that certain domestic
refiners had to create individual quality baselines (representing
the quality of gasoline produced by them in 1990) and subsequent domestic production need only satisfy such baselines,
whereas foreign manufacturers were required to satisfy the
statutory baselines provided in the law.122 The panel report concluded that the rule violated Article III:4 because imported
gasoline was required to meet the statutory baseline, while domestic gasoline need only meet the applicable individual baseline.123 Clearly, the United States was in violation of Article III
because it did not treat like products alike.
3. Article XI: General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
Article XI may be the GATT rule with which most people are
familiar. Essentially, Article XI prohibits any kind of quantita118. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. III:2.
119. Id. art. III:4.
120. WTO Appellate Body Report on Gasoline: United States – Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, AB-1996-1, WT/DS2/AB/R, 35
I.L.M. 603 (1996) (adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline Case].
121. Id. para. I.B.
122. Id. para. I.B.3.iii.
123. Id. para. I.C. The United States did not appeal this finding at the
Appellate Body level.
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tive restriction on imports.124 Article XI provides in relevant
part:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on
the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for
125
the territory of any other contracting party.

The most typical quantitative restriction on imports is the use
of a quota or an outright ban either through direct or indirect
action. An example of an indirect ban or quota would be the
requirement of a license to import goods.
There have been many panels through the GATT/WTO’s relatively short history which have addressed Article XI claims.
The most notable include the Beef Hormone dispute,126 and the
Tuna I,127 Tuna II,128 and Shrimp Turtle disputes.129 In the Beef
Hormones dispute, the EC attempted to prohibit imports of beef
containing hormones from Canada and the United States.130 In
the Tuna I and II disputes, the United States attempted to ban
the importation of tuna which was fished using methods that

124. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XI.
125. Id. art. XI:1.
126. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS/48/AB/R, (Jan. 16, 1998), 1998 WL 25520 at 1 [hereinafter Beef Hormones Case].
127. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States – Restricth
tions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39 Supp.) at 155 (1993), reprinted
in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (Aug. 16, 1991) (unadopted) [hereinafter Tuna I].
128. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report, United States – Restrictions
on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS29/R, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (June 16,
1994) [hereinafter Tuna II] (unadopted).
129. WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States – Import Prohibitions of
Certain Shrimps and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R/Corr.1 (May 15, 1998),
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) [hereinafter Shrimp Turtle Panel Report];
WTO Appellate Body Report on United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), reprinted in 38
I.L.M. 118 (1999) [hereinafter Shrimp Turtle AB Report] (adopted on Nov. 6,
1998).
130. Beef Hormones Case, supra note 126.
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were not considered “dolphin-safe.”131 In the Shrimp Turtle dispute, the United States attempted to ban the importation of
shrimp that were harvested using methods which were not seaturtle friendly.132 In each of these disputes, the trade restrictions were considered violations of Article XI.133
The rules discussed above provide an illustration of the legal
rules a trading Member may use to challenge a trade measure
or restriction of another trading Member. However, there is an
important exception to these rules provided for in Article XX.
Generally, Article XX provides that a Member may institute a
trade restriction if that restriction is necessary to protect human, animal or plant life, or, inter alia, is related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.134 Part IV, infra, discusses in greater depth the application of the Article XX exception.
IV. ARTICLE XX GENERAL EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
A. Description of the General Exceptions Clause
The Article XX General Exceptions Clause is of particular
importance to the WTO’s most contentious issue in recent
years—the relationship or, more precisely, conflict between
trade and environmental protection.135 This trade-environment
conflict first came to a head in the Tuna I and Tuna II disputes.136 Even though the results of Tuna I and Tuna II were
never adopted by the GATT Council,137 the cases received wide-

131. Tuna I, supra note 127, paras. 2.7–2.8; Tuna II, supra note 128, para.
1.1. See also, infra notes 276–283 and accompanying text discussing the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act.
132. Shrimp Turtle Panel Report, supra note 129, para. 2.6.
133. See, e.g., Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 7.1(a) (“The import prohibitions
imposed by the United States with respect to certain yellowfin tuna and certain yellowfin tuna products of ‘intermediary nations’ … are contrary to Article XI:1.”); Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129, para. 7.16 (“[T]he
United States [sic] prohibition on imports of shrimp from non-certified Members violates Article XI:1.”).
134. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XX(b), (g).
135. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 532.
136. See generally Tuna I, supra note 127; Tuna II, supra note 128.
137. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 532.
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spread attention and caused many to view the GATT in a very
unfavorable light.138
As discussed above, Article XX is a defense to a trade restriction139 that is invoked by the trading member who imposed a
measure that another trading member argues is a restriction on
trade in violation of the GATT Agreement. The practice of the
DSU panels “has been to interpret Article XX narrowly, to place
the burden on the party invoking Article XX to justify its invocation, and not to examine Article XX exceptions unless invoked.”140 A discussion of the structure of Article XX is necessary for understanding its analysis in DSU panels. This Article
will focus solely on three of the exceptions articulated in Article
XX: XX(b)’s protection of health exception,141 Article XX(d)’s enforcement exception,142 and Article XX(g)’s conservation exception.143 The reason for this focus is because these three exceptions, compared to the other exceptions of Article XX, “have
been the subject of an extraordinarily detailed Appellate Body
jurisdiction developed during the first seven years of WTO’s
existence.”144
Article XX consists of three main parts, which the next section of the Article addresses in turn. First is the list of measures a contracting party may impose that fall within Article
XX’s scope.145 This part is often referred to as the “policy test.”146
138. See, e.g., Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade; “No Country Can Protect Its Own Smidgen of Air or Ocean”, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991,
at A21 (arguing that the analysis and reasoning of the panel would invalidate
laws designed to protect endangered species in the United States).
139. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 533 (explaining the proper
analysis of an Article XX defense).
140. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 5.22.
141. For the language of article XX(b), see infra note 145.
142. For the language of article XX(d), see infra note 145.
143. For the language of article XX(g), see infra note 145.
144. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 532.
145. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XX. The list of measures which fall
within Article XX’s scope includes those which are:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c) relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with GATT rules themselves;
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Second is what is called the “nexus requirement.”147 Third is
Article XX’s introduction, which is often referred to as the “chapeau.”148
B. Analysis of Article XX
1. The Policy Test
The Appellate Body has declared that a proper analysis of an
Article XX defense must begin with a determination of whether
the trade measure at issue is covered under one of Article XX’s
enumerated measures.149 For example, under Article XX(b), the
panel would inquire whether the trade measure or provision is

(e) relating to the products of prison labor;
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources;
(h) undertaken pursuant to obligations of certain international commodity agreements;
(i) involving restrictions on exports necessary to ensure domestic
supplies when the domestic price is held below the world price by the
government for price stabilization reasons; and
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in short
supply.
Id. See also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 532–33.
146. See, e.g., Yavitz, supra note 94, at 215.
147. Although typically referred to as the necessary requirement, this definition is a misnomer. Although Art. XX(b) and (d) require that the measure
be necessary for the goal sought, Art. XX(g) does not require the restrictive
measure to be necessary to the objective of protecting the exhaustible natural
resource; instead, it only requires that it “relate” to the objective. WTO
Agreement, supra note 2, art. XX(b),(d), (g). However, this difference may not
have a significant impact, “presumably because any measure that limits depletion of a natural resource is justified per se” and, arguably, would meet a
necessary requirement in any event. Philip Bentley Q.C., A Re-Assessment of
Article XX, Paragraphs (B) and (G) of GATT 1994 in the Light of Growing
Consumer and Environmental Concern About Biotechnology, 24 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 107, 112 (2000). Therefore, to avoid any confusion, this Article will
use the term “nexus requirement” to avoid any further confusion in developing
this term.
148. For the language of the chapeau, see infra note 219 and accompanying
text.
149. See, e.g., Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129. See also JACKSON
ET AL., supra note 110, at 533.
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necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
Analysis of this requirement is fairly straightforward and the
easiest of the three requirements to apply and satisfy.150 To illustrate this point, many of the challenged measures brought
under the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures that
were found inconsistent with GATT/WTO rules, in fact, satisfied this first requirement under Article XX. Examples of such
disputes include: the Thai Cigarettes dispute,151 where the panel
concluded that a measure to reduce cigarette use was within
the policy area, but later found the measures Thailand imposed
inconsistent with the GATT rules on other grounds;152 Tuna II,
where the panel determined that the protection of dolphin life
was in the policy area, however, later found that the measures
imposed by the United States were inconsistent with the GATT
rules on other grounds;153 and, with the same result for the
United States as that in Tuna II, the Shrimp Turtle dispute,
where the panel found that the protection of turtles as an endangered species was within the policy area.154
2. The Nexus Requirement
In order for a WTO Member to successfully raise a defense
under Article XX (b) and (d), the measure must be strictly necessary for the objective pursued with respect to the defenses
raised.155 For defenses raised under Article XX(g), the measure
must be “related to” the conservation of an exhaustible natural
resource.156 In other words, the nexus test prohibits a Member
150. See Yavitz, supra note 94, at 215.
151. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Thai Restrictions on
Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D.
th
(37 Supp.) at 200 (1990), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991) [hereinafter Thai
Cigarettes].
152. For a full discussion of the Thai Cigarettes dispute, see notes 159–179
and accompanying text.
153. See Tuna II, supra note 128, at 890–98.
154. Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129, para. 160 (explaining that
the panel agreed that the US measure falls within the terms of Article XX(g),
but the issue was whether the US measure constituted “a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail” or “a disguised restriction on international trade” under the chapeau).
155. See, e.g., WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XX(b) (requiring that the
measure be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health).
156. See id. art. XX(g).
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from adopting a measure that is inconsistent with any other
GATT/WTO provision if an alternative, which is not inconsistent with other GATT/WTO provisions, can reasonably be employed by such Member.157 However, this nexus test is not
whether the policy underlying the measure is necessary but,
rather, whether the measure is necessary to achieve the stated
policy objective.158
3. Application of the Nexus Requirement
a. Thai Cigarettes Dispute
The best way to illustrate the nexus requirement is through
analysis of the Thai Cigarettes dispute. The Thai Cigarettes
dispute involved a challenge brought by the United States with
regards to the Thai government’s restrictions on imports of, and
disproportionate taxes on, foreign-made cigarettes.159 The panel
found that Thailand’s restrictions on imports were in violation
of Article XI:1 because the government had not granted licenses
for the importation of cigarettes in ten years.160 However, the
panel found that the regulations relating to the excise, business, and municipal taxes on cigarettes were consistent with
Thailand’s obligations under Article III of the GATT.161 The
157. Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 74.
158. Yavitz, supra note 94, at 215.
159. See Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 1. Under section 27 of the
Tobacco Act, 1966, the importation of various types of tobacco was prohibited
except by license granted by the Director-General of the Excise Department or
a competent officer authorized by him. But licenses have only been granted to
the Thai Tobacco Monopoly, and the monopoly has only imported cigarettes on
three occasions in the previous 25 years. Id. para. 6.
160. Id. para. 67. Article XI:1 provides in relevant part that “[n]o prohibitions or restrictions ... made effective through...import licenses...shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party....” WTO Agreement, supra
note 2, art. XI:1.
161. Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 88. This conclusion was reached
because there was no showing on the part of the United States that the taxes
were applied contrary to Article III, only that they could have been applied
inconsistent with Article III, and the possibility that the Thai Act might be
applied contrary to Article III:2 was, by itself, not sufficient to make it inconsistent with the General Agreement.” Id. para. 86. See also id. paras. 84, 85
(discussing the excise tax and business and municipal tax, respectively). Both
paragraphs state the same result and rationale.
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United States argued, inter alia, that the restrictions on imports could not be defended under Article XX(b) because the
Thai measures were not necessary to protect human health.162
The United States asked the panel to recommend that Thailand
eliminate its offensive restrictions and amend its tax regime to
conform with its obligations under the GATT.163
Thailand argued that its restrictions were justified under Article XX(b) because chemical and other additives contained in
U.S. cigarettes might make them more harmful than Thai cigarettes.164 Thailand also argued that the more harmful imported
cigarettes could only be eliminated through a prohibition on
cigarette imports and, therefore, the measure was “necessary to
protect human health” as permitted under Article XX(b).165 Additionally, Thailand argued that the production and consumption of tobacco undermined the objectives set forth in the Preamble of the GATT. These objectives included raising the standard of living, thus ensuring full employment thus increasing
real income and demand, and developing the full resources of
the world.166 Thailand argued that smoking lowered the standard of living and increased illness, leading to large and unnecessary disbursements attributable to increased medical costs,
which consequently reduced real income and prevented the efficient use of resources.167 The United States countered that
Thailand “could pursue the objective of seeking to prevent the
increased number of smokers without imposing a ban on imports ... through education and the recognition of the effects of
smoking rather than restraints on the availability of cigarettes.”168 Moreover, the United States responded that Thailand
could not successfully “argue that the ban on imports was necessary to protect human life or health since domestic produc-

162. See id. para. 12. Article XX(b) states in relevant part that “nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by
any contracting party of measures: (b) necessary to protect human ... life or
health.” WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Art. XX.
163. See Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 13.
164. See id. para. 14.
165. Id. para. 21.
166. See id. para. 21.
167. See id.
168. See id. para. 23.
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tion, sales and exports of cigarettes and tobacco remained at
high levels.”169
The panel accepted that smoking was a “serious risk to human health”170 and that measures “designed to reduce the consumption of cigarettes fell within the scope of Article XX(b),”
which clearly permits contracting parties to give priority to
human health over trade liberalization.171 However, this ability
is not without limits. The measure, even for the purpose of giving priority to human health had to be “necessary.”172 The panel
concluded that the import restrictions imposed by Thailand
could be considered necessary only if there were no alternative
measures consistent or less inconsistent with the goals of the
GATT.173 The panel then examined whether the objectives of
the Thai government could be met through other measures
more consistent with the GATT.174 The panel noted the strict,
nondiscriminatory labeling and ingredient disclosure regulations implemented by other governments which allowed them to
better control the content of cigarettes and increase consumer
awareness of the dangers associated with tobacco use.175
The panel ultimately determined that these alternative, nondiscriminatory labeling programs may be more consistent with
the GATT than an outright ban on cigarette importation. These
measures could be implemented on a national treatment176 basis
in accordance with Article III:4 and could require complete disclosure of ingredients coupled with a ban on unhealthy substances.177 Another possibility suggested by the panel was a ban
on cigarette advertising of both domestic and foreign-made
cigarettes.178 These are some examples of “various measures
169. See id.
170. Id. para 73. This conclusion was influenced by reports prepared by the
World Health Organization, whose work created a number of recommendations designed to reduce smoking. Id. para. 56.
171. See id. para. 73.
172. See id.
173. See id. para. 74.
174. See id. para. 77.
175. See id.
176. For a discussion of national treatment, see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
177. See Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151.
178. See id. para. 78. The panel concluded that a ban on advertising would
normally meet the requirements of Article III:4. Id. A general ban on adver-
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consistent with the General Agreement which were reasonably
available to Thailand to control the quality and quantity of
cigarettes smoked and which, taken together, could achieve the
health policy goals that the Thai government pursues by restricting the importation of cigarettes inconsistently with Article XI:1.”179
b. Tuna/Dolphin Dispute (Tuna I)
The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA)180
requires a general prohibition of the “taking” and importation of
marine mammals into the United States.181 On August 28,
1990, the United States imposed an embargo on imports of
commercial yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna products harvested with purse-seine nets182 in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
tising would create unequal competitive opportunities between existing Thai
producers and new foreign producers, however, the measure would satisfy
Article XX(b) because additional advertising rights would risk stimulating
demand for cigarettes. Id.
179. Id. para. 81.
180. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat.
1027 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 USC). For example, 16
U.S.C. § 1371 provides that “there shall be a moratorium on the taking and
importation of marine mammals and marine mammal products … during
which time no permit may be issued for the taking of any marine mammal
and no marine mammal or marine mammal product may be imported into the
United States.”
181. See Tuna I, supra note 127, para 2.3.
182. Id. para. 2.1.
A fishing vessel using this technique locates a school of fish and
sends out a motorboat (a “seine skiff”) to hold one end of the purseseine net. The vessel motors around the perimeter of the school of
fish, unfurling the net and encircling the fish, and the seine skiff then
attaches its end of the net to the fishing vessel. The fishing vessel
then purses the net by winching in a cable at the bottom edge of the
net, and draws in the top cables of the net to gather its entire contents.
Id.
Studies monitoring ... catch levels have sown that fish and dolphins
are found together in a number of areas around the world and that
this may lead to incidental taking of dolphins during fishing operations. In the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP), a particular association between dolphins and tuna has long been observed, such that
fisherman located schools of underwater tuna by finding and chasing
dolphins….
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Ocean.183 The United States considered the provisions of the
MMPA to be justified under Article XX(b) because they served
the purpose of protecting dolphin life and health and were ‘necessary’ within the meaning of the provision. The United States
argued that with respect to the protection of dolphin life outside
its jurisdiction, there was no alternative measure reasonably
available to achieve this purpose.184 However, Mexico, the party
who brought the dispute, argued that Article XX(b) was not applicable to a measure imposed to protect the life or health of
animals outside the jurisdiction of the United States.185 Mexico
also submitted that the import measure was not “necessary”
because alternative means, consistent or less inconsistent with
the GATT, were available to the United States to protect dolphin life.186 Mexico specifically noted international cooperation
as a more consistent alternative action.187
The panel concluded that even if Article XX(b) was interpreted to permit extrajurisdictional protection of health and
life, the United States would not meet the requirement of necessity set out in Article XX(b).188 This failure to satisfy the Article XX(b) necessity requirement was because the United
States:
[H]ad not demonstrated to the panel - as required of the party
invoking an Article XX exception - that it had exhausted all
options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection objectives through measures consistent with the General
Agreement, in particular through the negotiation of international cooperative arrangements, which would seem to be desirable in view of the fact that dolphins roam the waters of
189
many states and the high seas.

Not only were less restrictive alternatives available, but the
U.S. measure was also not necessary within Article XX(b).190
The measure was deemed unnecessary because, under the
Id. para. 2.2.
183. See id. para 2.7.
184. See id. para. 5.24.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id. para. 5.28.
189. Id.
190. See id.
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MMPA, the United States linked the maximum incidental dolphin taking rate which Mexico had to meet during a particular
period as a condition for importing tuna, to the taking rate actually recorded for U.S. fisherman during the same period.191
Thus, Mexican authorities could never predict whether, at any
given time, their policies conformed to that of the United
States.192 The panel found that limitations on trade based on
such unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as necessary to protect the health or life of dolphins.193 The panel’s conclusion was based largely on the U.S. failure to exhaust all reasonably available options to pursue its dolphin protection objectives.194
c. The EC Asbestos Dispute195
The EC Asbestos dispute provides an important component to
the Article XX analysis and its necessity requirement. The EC
Asbestos dispute represents the first time both a panel and Appellate Body decision condoned a ban on imported goods pursuant to Article XX(b).196 The EC Asbestos dispute concerned a
191. Id.
192. See id. paras. 5.28, 5.33.
193. See id. para. 5.28.
194. See id. However, even though the U.S. measures did not pass scrutiny
under the WTO’s DSU, with the help of subsequent international agreements,
the amount of dolphin deaths has drastically decreased over time. Over the
past decade, fisherman have become significantly more proficient at catching
yellowfin tuna without harming dolphins. Tangled Nets, supra note 27, at 38.
Techniques and nets have been changed to allow the mammals to escape. In 1998, an international agreement - now endorsed by the
United States, the European Union, Vanuatu and 13 Latin American
countries - set rules to limit dolphin death to fewer than 5,000 a year,
a number thought to be sustainable. Last year, out of an estimated
population of more than 9m dolphins in the eastern Pacific, fewer
than 1,600 died, compared with 133,000 in 1986.
Id.
195. WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities – Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (Mar. 12 2001), 40
I.L.M. 1193 [hereinafter Asbestos AB Report]; WTO Dispute Settlement Panel
Report on European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Asbestos
Panel Report], available at www.wto/org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.
htm.
196. Kelly, supra note 109, at 716–17.
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French Decree prohibiting the importation of white asbestos
from Canada due to the negative health concerns associated
with the use of white asbestos.197 The panel held that the EC
(defending the French Decree) made a prima facie case for the
non-existence of a reasonably available alternative to an outright ban of asbestos products, and the need for substitute
products.198 The panel gave great consideration to the comments provided by experts consulted in the course of the proceeding.199
At the Appellate Body level, Canada made four arguments.
First, based on the scientific evidence presented, Canada argued that the panel erred in finding that asbestos and asbestos
products pose a risk to human health.200 Second, the panel had
an obligation to quantify the risks associated with asbestos and
could not simply rely on the hypotheses of French Authorities.201
Third, the panel erred by concluding that a ban was necessary
to halt the spread of asbestos-related health risks.202 Finally,
Canada argued that “controlled use” was a reasonably available
alternative to the French Decree.203
As to the first argument, the Appellate Body dismissed Canada’s contention that the evidence before the panel was insufficient to support its findings. All four scientific experts consulted by the panel concurred that asbestos products “constitute
a risk to human health, and the panel’s conclusions on this
point are faithful to the views expressed by the four scientists.”204 As to Canada’s second argument, the Appellate Body
held that there is no requirement under Article XX(b) to quantify the risk to human life or health.205 With regards to the third
argument, the Appellate Body noted that:
197. See Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, paras. 2.3–5. See also
Kelly, supra note 109, at 717.
198. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 8.222
199. Id.
200. See Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195, para. 165.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. para. 166. In addition, the carcinogenic nature of asbestos has
been acknowledged since 1977 by international bodies. Id.
205. See id. para. 167 (citing Beef Hormones Case, supra note 126, para.
186). The Appellate Body concluded that a risk may be evaluated either in
quantitative or qualitative terms. Id.
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It is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation. France has determined and the
panel accepted, that the chosen level of health protection by
France is a ‘halt’ to the spread of asbestos-related health
206
risks.

Accordingly, the Appellate Body found that it was “perfectly
legitimate” for a Member to seek to halt the spread of a highly
risky product while allowing the use of a less risky product in
its place.207
The fourth, and most compelling, argument made by Canada
related to the availability of “controlled use” as an alternative
measure. The measures of controlled use that Canada presented were influenced by ILO Convention 162.208 These measures included:
(i) making work in which exposure to asbestos may occur subject to regulations prescribing adequate engineering controls
and work practices, including workplace hygiene; (ii) prescribing special rules and procedures, including the authorization
of a competent authority in the field, for the use of asbestos or
of certain types of asbestos or products containing asbestos or
for certain work processes; (iii) where necessary to protect the
health of workers and technically practicable, replacement of
asbestos by other materials or products evaluated as harmless
or less harmful; and, (iv) total or partial prohibition of the use
of asbestos or of certain types of asbestos or products contain209
ing asbestos in certain work processes.

206. See id. para. 168.
207. See id.
208. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 3.139 (referencing Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos). For more information on
the Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos see infra note 260
and accompanying text.
209. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 3.139. In addition, national regulations should:
(i) establish procedures for the notification by the employer of certain
types of work involving exposure to asbestos; prescribe adequate engineering controls and work practices to prevent or control exposure
to asbestos; (ii) enforce laws and regulations through an adequate
and appropriate system of inspection, including appropriate penalties; (iii) prescribe limits for the exposure of workers to asbestos and

File: Emslie MACRO 03.13.05.doc

2005]

Created on: 3/14/2005 9:27 AM

LABELING PROGRAMS

Last Printed: 3/14/2005 4:30 PM

523

The Appellate Body balked at the opportunity to support unrestricted free trade and took a more narrow view of the term
“reasonably available.”210 However, the Appellate Body, by incorporating the holdings of various other panel reports that
struck down assorted Article XX defenses, did not provide much
opportunity for subsequent attempts to eliminate reasonably
available alternatives.211 Consequently, the Appellate Body held
that an “alternative measure” is one that can achieve the same
objective as the challenged measure but is consistent or less
inconsistent with the GATT (and hence less restrictive).212 In
other words, an “alternative measure did not cease to be reasonably available simply because the alternative measure involved administrative difficulties for the Member.”213
The Appellate Body held that the determination of whether
an alternative measure is reasonably available is the extent to
which the alternative measure contributes to the realization of

make employers reduce exposure to as low a level as is reasonably
practicable; (iv) measure the concentrations of airborne asbestos dust
in workplaces and monitor the exposure of workers to asbestos at intervals; take appropriate measures to prevent pollution of the environment; (v) ensure that employers have established policies and procedures on measures for the education and periodic training of workers on asbestos hazards and methods of prevention and control; (vi)
establish standards for respiratory protective equipment and special
protective clothing for workers; (vii) recognize contractors qualified to
carry out the demolition of plants or structures containing friable asbestos insulation materials, and removal of asbestos from buildings
or structures; (viii) ensure that workers who are or have been exposed to asbestos are provided with free medical examinations to supervise their health in relation to the occupational hazard; and, (ix)
prescribe adequate labelling of containers, including material safety
data sheets indicating the asbestos content, the health risks and the
appropriate protection measures concerning the materials or the
product.
Id. para. 3.140.
210. See Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195, paras. 160, 170.
211. See, e.g., id. para. 170 (explaining that in determining whether a suggested alternative measure is reasonably available one factor that must be
taken into account is the conclusion drawn by the Panel in Thai Cigarettes).
212. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 3.318.
213. Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195, para. 169 (citing Gasoline Case,
supra note 120).
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the end pursued.214 In this case, France claimed that the restriction was aimed at preserving human life and health,
through the elimination of the well-known and life-threatening
health risks posed by asbestos products.215 Thus, the remaining
question would be whether controlled use would achieve the
same end as the Decree and constitute a less restrictive trade
measure than the Decree. In the panel’s view, “France would
not reasonably be expected to employ any alternative measure
if that measure would involve a continuation of the very risk
that the Decree seeks to halt.”216 More importantly, the panel
noted that “even in cases where ‘controlled use’ practices are
applied ‘with greater certainty,’ the scientific evidence suggests
that the level of exposure can, in some circumstances, still be
high enough for there to be a ‘significant residual risk of developing asbestos-related diseases.’”217 For these reasons, the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that the EC had demonstrated that there was no reasonably available least restrictive
alternative to the French prohibition, and therefore, the Decree
was necessary to protect human life or health within the meaning of Article XX(b).218
4. The Chapeau
If the trade restriction satisfies one of the provisions set forth
in Article XX(a–j) and the provision satisfies the nexus requirement discussed above, then the final step in the analysis is
to determine whether the measure complies with the requirements of the chapeau. The chapeau conditions the availability
of the Article XX exception by subjecting the measure to the
requirement that:
214. Id. para. 172 (citing WTO Report of the Appellate Body, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R (Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Korea Beef Dispute]).
215. See id.
216. See id. para. 174.
217. See id.
218. However, The Appellate Body’s conclusion in the EC Asbestos dispute
did differ from that of the panel report. Unlike the panel report, the Appellate
Body determined that chrysotile asbestos and PCG fibres were not like products within the meaning of Article III:4. See Asbestos AB Report, supra note
195, para. 126. However, even if they were like products, the Appellate Body
would agree with the panel that the French Decree would satisfy Article
XX(b). See id. para. 175.
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Such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of [the] measures [listed in
219
Art. XX) (a)-(j)].

Therefore, the “scope for Member Countries to adopt public
health or environmental protection measures that restrict free
trade is limited by the prohibition on arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination and disguised restrictions on trade contained in
the chapeau to Article XX.”220 The Shrimp Turtle dispute provides the perfect illustration of the analysis of the three requirements of Article XX.
C. The Embodiment of Article XX’s Three Requirements: The
Shrimp Turtle Dispute
The Shrimp Turtle dispute is a particularly telling example of
how Article XX is applied because it contains the most detailed
consideration of the meaning of the chapeau.221 In 1987, the
United States issued regulations, pursuant to the 1973 Endangered Species Act,222 which required all U.S. shrimp trawlers to
use turtle excluder devices (TEDs) while fishing in areas where
there was a possibility that shrimp trawling would interfere
with sea turtles.223 In 1989, the United States enacted Section
609 of Public Law 101-162224 which imposed an import ban on
shrimp harvested with fishing techniques that may adversely

219. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XX.
220. Bentley, supra note 147, at 112.
221. Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129, paras. 146–86. The Shrimp
Turtle dispute “stands in stark contrast to Tuna-Dolphin dispute under
GATT.” Kelly, supra note 109, at 711.
222. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 76 Stat. 884
(1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §1531).
223. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 552 (providing a summary of the
regulations promulgated under the 1973 Endangered Species Act as it existed
in 1987).
224. Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiaciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. 101-162, § 609l 103 Stat. 988
(1989) (codified as note at 16 U.S.C.A.§ 1537) [hereinafter Appropriations
Act].
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affect sea turtles.225 This was followed by the U.S. Department
of State issuance of its 1996 Guidelines which provided that,
“all shrimp imported into the United States must be accompanied by a form attesting that the shrimp was harvested either
in the waters of a certified nation or under conditions that do
not adversely affect sea turtles.”226 Although the United States
legitimately sought to protect turtles by differentiating between
shrimp caught with TEDs and those caught without TEDs, the
WTO found that the United States violated the GATT rules.227
The Appellate Body held that although the U.S. measure
served a legitimate environmental objective under Article
XX(g), the measure, as applied by the United States, constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between the
WTO Members, and was thus contrary to the chapeau of Article
XX.228 The Appellate Body began its analysis of Article XX’s
chapeau by stating that:
[In] order for a measure to be applied in a manner which
would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, three elements must exist. First, the application of the measure must
result in discrimination. As we stated in United States —
Gasoline, the nature and quality of this discrimination is dif225. Id. However, there were certain exceptions. For instance,
the import ban would not apply to harvesting nations that are certified as (i) having a fishing environment (e.g., lack of sea turtles or use
of artisinal harvesting methods) which does not pose a threat of the
incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of shrimp harvesting or
(ii) providing documentary evidence of a regulatory program governing the incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of shrimp trawling comparable to the US program and having an average rate of incidental taking of sea turtles comparable to that of US vessels.
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 553.
226. Appropriations Act, supra note 224.
227. Kelly, supra note 109, at 711. Although the United States subsequently brought its legislation into compliance, its failure to do so would have
allowed affected nations to seek compensation from the United States for the
cost of the ban. Id. Compensation could have exceeded $200 million dollars
per year. See Press Release, Sea Turtles Restoration Project, Environmentalists Blast International Trade Panel Decision Which Places Sea Turtles and
U.S. Endangered Species Act at Risk (Mar. 19, 1998) (citing the National
Fisheries Institute), at http://www.seaturtles.org/press_release2.cfm?pressID
=20 (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
228. Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129, para. 186.
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ferent from the discrimination in the treatment of products
which was already found to be inconsistent with one of the
substantive obligations of the GATT 1994, such as Articles I,
III or XI. Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character ... Third, this discrimination must occur between countries where the same conditions prevail....
Thus, the standards embodied in the language of the chapeau
are not only different from the standard used in determining
that Section 609 is violative of the substantive rules of Article
229
XI:1 of the GATT 1994.

Therefore, “a balance must be struck between the right of a
Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty
of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other
Members.”230
The Appellate Body found the controlling fact to be that the
actual application of the U.S. measure which, “required other
WTO Members to adopt a regulatory program that is not
merely comparable, but rather essentially the same, as that applied to U.S. shrimp trawlers.”231 The Appellate Body concluded
that, “thus the effect was to establish a rigid and unbending
standard by which U.S. officials determined whether or not
countries would be certified, thus granting or refusing other
countries the right to export shrimp to the United States.”232
The Appellate Body was unmoved by the uniform standard the
United States imposed throughout its territory and further concluded that although it might be acceptable for a government in
establishing its domestic policy to adopt a single standard, it
was not acceptable with regards to international trade:
[F]or one WTO Member to use an economic embargo to require
other Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive
regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in
force within that Member’s territory, without taking into consideration different conditions which may occur in the territo233
ries of those other Members.

The problem was exacerbated because there were instances
in which shrimp caught using methods identical to those em229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. para. 150 (emphasis in original).
Id. para. 156 (emphasis in original).
Id. para. 163 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. para. 164 (emphasis in original).
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ployed by U.S. fisherman were excluded solely because those
countries were not certified by the United States.234 This result
was difficult to reconcile with the stated policy objective of the
United States and was therefore found “unnecessary.”235
Another problem with the U.S. measure was that the United
States did not engage in any “across-the-board negotiations”
with any of the other Members before enforcing the import prohibition.236 The Appellate Body cited both the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development237 and Agenda 21238 and found
that “[u]nilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be
avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary
or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be
based on international consensus.”239 Although one regional
agreement with selected states existed, it alone was insufficient240 because it was clear to the Appellate Body that the
United States “negotiated seriously with some, but not with

234. Id. para. 165.
235. Id.
236. Id. para. 166. The Appellate Body considered these negotiations vital
because “the protection and conservation of highly migratory species of sea
turtles ... demands concerted and cooperative efforts on the part of the many
countries whose waters are traversed in the course of recurrent sea turtle
migrations.” Id. para. 168.
237. Id. para. 168.
238. Id.
239. Id. (emphasis omitted). Furthermore, the Shrimp Turtle Appellate
Body report notes that:
WTO members in the Report of the CTE, forming part of the Report
of the General Council to Ministers on the occasion of the Singapore
Ministerial Conference, endorsed and supported: ... multilateral solutions based on international cooperation and consensus as the best
and most effective way for governments to tackle environmental problems of a transboundary or global nature. WTO Agreements and
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are representative of
efforts of the international community to pursue shared goals, and in
the development of a mutually supportive relationship between them,
due respect must be afforded to both.
Id.
240. Id. para. 172.
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other Members (including the appellees)” and that effect was
“plainly discriminatory” and “unjustifiable.”241
In order to discuss whether product labels and labeling programs may satisfy the three requirements of Article XX or, in
the alternative, whether any other restrictive trade measure
may pass Article XX analysis when there is a potential for the
existence of a successful and efficient labeling program, a discussion of the GATT/WTO panel and Appellate Body reports
that have confronted the issue of labeling is necessary. Part V
will explore these disputes and the requirements for labeling
programs which have resulted from them.
V. GATT/WTO PANELS THAT HAVE CONFRONTED THE ISSUE OF
LABELING
Although there have been quite a few GATT/WTO panels that
have considered the issue of labeling, this Article will focus on
three: (1) the Thai Cigarettes dispute; (2) the EC Asbestos dispute; and (3) the Tuna I dispute. These disputes were chosen
because they best reflect the broad spectrum that Article XX
was intended to cover. The Thai Cigarettes panel preferred labeling as a substitute to an outright ban or other more restrictive trade barriers supposedly created to protect human health,
yet the EC Asbestos panel concluded that labeling and other
methods of controlled use are insufficient to ward off the dangerous effects of asbestos on human health. Last, in the Tuna I
dispute, the panel decided that the labeling program, designed
to protect the environment and wildlife, was permissible under
the GATT.
A. Thai Cigarettes Dispute
As discussed earlier, the GATT panel concluded that the import restrictions imposed by Thailand242 could be considered
necessary with respect to Article XX(b) only if there were no

241. Id. In addition, there was differing treatment of countries desiring
certification because of the difference in the level of effort made by the US in
transferring the required TED technology to specific countries. Id.
242. The Royal Thai government placed restrictions on imports of foreign
made cigarettes and applied disproportionate taxes on foreign made cigarettes. Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 1.
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alternative measures consistent with the GATT.243 The panel
found that there were other measures that Thailand could incorporate, especially considering that contracting parties to the
GATT may, in accordance with Article III:4 of the GATT, “impose laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase transportation, distribution or
use of imported products provided they do not thereby accord
treatment to imported products less favourable than that accorded to ‘like’ products of national origin.”244 In fact, as the
panel noted, other countries have introduced strict, nondiscriminatory labeling requirements which allowed their governments to control, and the public to be informed of, the contents and hazards of cigarettes.245 Therefore, the panel decided
that such labeling programs and dangerous content bans, implemented on a national treatment basis in accordance with
Article III:4, would be appropriate alternative measures to import bans and disproportionate tax treatment that had been
deemed inconsistent with the GATT.246
Two factors were critical to the panel’s determination. First,
the panel was influenced by the testimony of World Health Organization (WHO) representatives. The WHO made a number
of recommendations designed to reduce smoking based on the
findings of an expert Committee convened to study smoking
control strategies in developing countries.247 These recommendations included activities aimed at curbing the promotion and
sale of tobacco products and a compilation of standards of conformity in terms of health warnings and product information to
be used in the form of product labeling.248 Second, the panel
noted that Thailand had already implemented nondiscriminatory controls on demand including, inter alia, warnings on cigarette packs.249 Such non-discriminatory controls are
examples of “various measures consistent with the General
Agreement which were reasonably available to Thailand to control the quality and quantity of cigarettes smoked and which,
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. para. 75.
Id.
Id. para. 77.
Id.
Id. para. 56.
Id. paras. 56, 78.
Id.
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taken together, could achieve the health policy goals that the
Thai government pursued by restricting the importation of
cigarettes inconsistently with Article XI:1.”250
The Thai Cigarettes dispute determined that a labeling program coupled with other programs, such as advertising regulations and educational programs, could be deemed a reasonable
or feasible alternative to a trade restriction under Article XX.
However, it is important to note that, arguably, a reasonable or
feasible alternative under Article XX need not be in complete
compliance with the GATT. An alternative measure that is less
inconsistent with the GATT than the challenge restriction may
suffice. However, with regards to labeling programs this distinction may be academic because, as decided in the Tuna I dispute,251 labeling programs are fully consistent with the GATT.
B. EC Asbestos Dispute
The EC Asbestos dispute, admittedly, complicates the labeling solution. This case also concerned trade restrictions designed to address products that pose a risk to human health. In
this case, the French attempted to ban the use, production, and
import of asbestos and asbestos products because of their adverse health effects.252 The EC, on behalf of France, argued that
because of asbestos’ carcinogenic nature,253 asbestos fibers cannot be considered a “like product” to other fibers that do not
share the same chemical composition as asbestos.254 However,
the panel determined after extensive review that it was not decisive that asbestos and asbestos products do not have the same
chemical composition, nor that asbestos was “unique.” Rather,
the panel focused on “market access” and whether the products
250. Id. para. 81.
251. For a full discussion of the Tuna I dispute, see supra notes 180–194
and accompanying text.
252. See generally Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195. The health risks
posed by contact with asbestos are mesothelioma, a cancer of the lining of the
chest and the abdominal cavity; lung cancer; and asbestosis, in which the
lungs become scarred with fibrous tissue. See U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency Website, Asbestos – Asbestos in Your Home, at http://www.epa.gov/
asbestos/ashome.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
253. The carcinogenicity of asbestos and its fibers has been acknowledged
for some time by international bodies. See Asbestos Panel Report, supra note
195, para. 8.188.
254. Id.
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have the “same applications” and can “replace” each other for
some industrial uses.255
However, the Appellate Body found that the panel had erred
in its analysis.256 Their decision centered on the fact that different products often have similar uses and, although two products’ end uses might be similar, their physical properties may
be different.257 The Appellate Body therefore concluded that
when evaluating the criterion of physical property, evidence
relating to health risks associated with that product may be
pertinent in an examination of ‘likeness’ under Article III:4 of
the GATT.258
In addition to the analysis of likeness under Article III:4, the
EC Asbestos panel considered Canada’s argument for the use of
labels as a least restrictive trade measure vis-à-vis the use of
the restrictions placed by the EC. This argument addressed the
overall proposal by Canada of the controlled use approach.259
Canada relied on the principles of controlled use outlined in
ILO Convention 162.260 ILO Convention 162 included in its proposal, inter alia, that national regulations should prescribe
adequate labeling on containers, including material safety data
sheets indicating the asbestos content, the health risks and the
appropriate protection measures concerning the materials of
the product.261 It is important to stress that Canada’s argument
was not for a labeling program per se; instead, it argued for the
principle of controlled use, which included the implementation
of a labeling program.
The panel concluded that controlled use would not be reasonably available or feasible to the EC.262 Although it was possible to apply controlled use successfully “upstream” (mining and
manufacturing) or “downstream” (removal and destruction),
controlled use could not be applied to the building sector and
255. Id. See also Vogt, supra note 3, at 7.
256. See generally Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195.
257. Id. para 112. See also Vogt, supra note 3, at 7.
258. Vogt, supra note 3, at 7–8.
259. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 3.139.
260. Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos, June 24, 1986,
International Labour Organization, ILO 86B09.316 ENGL, recommendation
(ix), available at http://www.ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/english/convdisp2.htm [hereinafter ILO Convention 162].
261. Id.
262. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 8.212.
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was, therefore, not a true alternative measure.263 Therefore, the
difficulties of applying controlled use to these sectors made such
a program inadequate in relation to the decree’s policy objectives.264
This decision may rest on the fact that the exposure to dangerous asbestos and asbestos products is not restricted exclusively to workers who consistently use the products or to those
people responsible for its disposal.265 In fact, asbestos may pose
a risk to people in the general work area, as well as to spouses
of exposed workers.266 Moreover, as one of the experts who presented at the panel illustrated, exposure to asbestos may be the
result of pure chance.267 This observation is corroborated by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).268 The EPA explains that asbestos can be found in a variety of household
items including steam pipes, boilers, furnace ducts, resilient
floor tiles, cement sheet, decorative material sprayed on walls,
patching and joint compounds, roofing, shingles, and siding.269
If these items are disturbed, even by an individual involved in
home improvements, they may damage health.270
Can the Thai Decree and the French Decree be reasonably
distinguished even though one panel found that labeling and
similar programs were feasible alternatives to the Thai Decree,
but the other held that labeling and controlled use was not a
feasible alternative to the French Decree? The following may
help explain the reasoning. Arguably, a distinction may be
drawn between the underlying products in the two disputes.

263. Id. para. 8.209. The panel noted that the building sector was one of the
areas more particularly targeted by the measure contained in the decree. Id.
para 8.212.
264. Id. para. 8.209.
265. Id. para. 8.215.
266. Id.
267. Id. para. 8.215 n.185 (discussing the examples of the lecturer and the
fireman mentioned by Dr. Henderson during the meeting with experts).
268. See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Website, supra
note 252.
269. Id.
270. Id. However, “[m]ost people exposed to small amounts of asbestos, as
we all are in our daily lives, do not develop these health problems.” Id. Even
still, if the home-improver is interested or required to disturb products containing asbestos, the EPA encourages the use of a trained expert in asbestosremoval. Id.
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Although both products are clearly injurious to health, the
products are used and distributed differently and, therefore, the
effectiveness of a labeling program would differ for each product. One would assume that cigarette smokers typically purchase packs of cigarettes for themselves for personal use.
Therefore, a cigarette user would see the warnings on the pack.
On the other hand, asbestos and asbestos products are likely to
harm more than just the user of the product. Had the panel or
the Appellate Body found that controlled use was a feasible alternative to the French Decree and a labeling program was created, the program would likely have proven ineffective. Consider the situation of a builder using ceiling products containing
asbestos. If the label was on the asbestos product itself, the
builder would be cautioned on the effects of asbestos use. However, that would not adequately protect the homeowner, who
may later install a ceiling fan and become exposed to asbestos
dangers. In this example, a labeling program would not work
to warn all those who may be exposed to the hazardous product.
Surely, one could make a similar argument for cigarettes in
that cigarette users are not the only people who are endangered
by cigarette smoke, as evidenced by the growing studies on the
danger of second-hand smoke.271 A label on the cigarette pack,
which the non-smokers do not have contact with, will not adequately alert non-smokers to the dangers of inhaling secondhand smoke. Thus, the Thai government could have argued
that labeling alone could not be deemed a feasible alternative
because it does not protect the non-smoking population from the
dangers of cigarette smoke. This concern may have played a
role in the Thai Cigarette panel’s determination that a labeling
program alone would not be a feasible alternative. Rather, the
labeling program needed to be coupled with other programs
such as a restriction on advertising and/or educational programs. Such programs should help offset the dangers of secondhand smoke. Based on the results in the Thai Cigarettes and
EC Asbestos disputes, a labeling program alone may not be a
271. See, e.g., EPA Website, Smoke-free Homes: Secondhand Smoke Can
Make Children Suffer Serious Health Risks, at http://www.epa.gov/smokefree/
(last visited Jan. 23, 2005). See also Environmental Tobacco Smoke Related
Links, at http://www.epa.gov/ebtpages/airindoorenvironmentaltobaccosmoke.
html (last visited Jan. 23, 2005) (providing studies about the dangers of second-hand smoke).
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reasonable and feasible alternative to a defending party’s trade
restriction if it is designed to protect human health under Article XX(b)’s necessary requirement.272
C. Tuna I Dispute
The Tuna I dispute is a famous case, largely because of the
press coverage that it received and the U.S. public support behind the dolphin-safe labels at issue in the case.273 It involved a
challenge to the U.S. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information
Act (DPCIA), which provided a labeling standard for any tuna
product exported from, or offered for sale, in the United
States.274 Any producer, importer, exporter, distributor, or seller
of tuna or tuna products who labeled the product “Dolphin Safe”
or included any other term falsely suggesting that the tuna was
fished using a method that was not harmful to dolphins violated
the statute.275 Mexico argued that the labeling requirements of
the DPCIA were marking requirements within the scope of Article IX:1.276 The panel disagreed because the DPCIA’s labeling
provisions did not restrict the sale of tuna products. Tuna
products could be sold freely with or without the Dolphin Safe
label, and the provisions did not establish threshold require272. Recall that Article XX(b) requires that the trade restriction be “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.” WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XX(b) (emphasis added).
273. See Tangled Nets, supra note 27, at 38 (discussing the difficulty of selling tuna that is not dolphin-safe in the United States despite increased demand for tuna products).
274. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 2.12 (referencing Dolphin Protection
Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d) (1990)). Tuna products include any food product containing tuna processed for retail sale, except perishable items with a shelf life of fewer than three days. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(c)(5).
275. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1385(d)(1)(1990). This requirement is applicable if the tuna was fished in
either of two situations: (1) in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean by a fishing
boat using purse-seine nets which do not meet the U.S. requirements of being
dolphin safe, or (2) fished on the high seas by a fishing boat through drift net
fishing. Id. § 1385(d)(1)(A)&(B). Violators are subject to civil penalties. Id. §
1385(e).
276. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 5.41. Article IX:1 provides that “[e]ach
contracting party shall accord to the products of the territories of other contracting parties treatment with regard to marking requirements no less favourable than the treatment accorded to like products of any third country.”
WTO agreement, supra note 2, art. IX:1.
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ments that must be met in order to obtain an advantage to the
United States.277 The labeling provision, therefore, “did not
make the right to sell tuna or tuna products, nor the access to a
government-conferred advantage affecting the sale of tuna or
tuna products, conditional upon the use of tuna harvesting
methods.”278 Hence, the only remaining issue was whether the
DPCIA met the requirements of Article I:1.279 The panel found
that the controlling fact was that
[U]nder United States customs law, the country of origin of
fish was determined by the country or registry of the vessel
that had caught the fish; the geographical area where the fish
were caught was irrelevant for the determination of origin.
The labelling regulations governing the tuna caught in the
ETP thus applie[d] to all countries whose vessels fished in this
geographical area and thus did not distinguish between products originating in Mexico and products originating in other
280
countries.

The panel concluded that, for these reasons, the DPCIA and its
labeling requirements were not inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under Article I:1.281 Therefore it is
now safe to conclude that labeling requirements similar to the
DPCIA are not inconsistent with the GATT generally.

277. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 5.42 (“Any advantage which might possibly result from access to this label depends on the free choice by consumers to
give preference to tuna carrying the ‘Dolphin Safe’ label.”).
278. Id.
279. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. I:1. Article I:1 provides that:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or
in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs
2 and 4 of Article III any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other CONTRACTING PARTIES.
Id.
280. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 5.43.
281. Id.
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The above cases support the general proposition that labeling
programs are consistent with GATT/WTO rules, although they
may not always be a reasonable alternative to other measures.
Moreover, these cases provide a framework for determining
what attributes and characteristics a labeling program must
possess in order to satisfy Article XX analysis. Further, pursuant to these cases, a labeling program that possesses these attributes and characteristics may in fact be considered the least
restrictive trade measure available to a defending trading
Member. However, this ability may, in fact, be a double-edged
sword. If a labeling program satisfies Article XX analysis, it
may be found to be the least restrictive trade measure compared to other measures available to a defending nation. This
available alternative may stymie other restrictive trade measures that the defending trading member is considering or has
implemented under Article XX. Such a result is possible because, as discussed previously in Part IV of this Article, the
nexus requirement of Article XX mandates that a Member may
not adopt a measure inconsistent with the GATT if an alternative measure is available which is not inconsistent, or is less
inconsistent, with other GATT provisions, and is as effective as
the more restrictive measure. A labeling program which possesses the attributes and characteristics discussed in the next
part of this Article may fill this role in many situations.
VI. MAY LABELING PROGRAMS DEVELOP INTO A CATCHALL
LEAST RESTRICTIVE TRADE MEASURE?
The development of labeling programs, their successes (both
real and potential), and the relative acceptance of these programs by GATT/WTO panels, raises the question of whether
labeling programs may develop into a catchall least restrictive
trade measure for the purpose of Article XX analysis. If that
were to be the case, then if the possibility of a labeling program
exists, other trade measures may not survive the nexus requirement of Article XX. Given the successes of labeling programs in the past,282 the potential for greater successes in the

282. For example, the amendments to the Clean Air Act in the United
States have been successful in establishing U.S. compliance with the Montreal
Protocol. See Staffin, supra note 3, at 211–12.
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future,283 and the legality of labeling programs under Art. III:4
of the GATT,284 labeling programs may potentially trump other
challenged restrictions under Article XX. This is particularly
true because it is difficult to conceptualize other trade measures
that would be less restrictive than a labeling program. However, recent decisions by the GATT/WTO suggest that proposed
labeling programs must have certain attributes, abilities and
conditions in order to be reasonably considered a least restrictive trade measure.
A. How Such a Labeling Program Would Need to Function
It is possible that successful labeling regimes could become
reasonably available alternative measures285 to many other
more restrictive trade measures proposed by trading members
seeking an Article XX defense. This may be an attractive route
for Members challenging a trade restriction, chiefly because an
alternative measure can only be ruled out if it is shown to be
impossible to implement.286 Moreover, an alternative measure
does not cease to be reasonably available simply because it
would involve administrative difficulties.287 However, it must be
reasonably available, meaning it must contribute to the realization of the end pursued288 and, last, it absolutely must not involve a continuation of the very risk that the challenged restriction seeks to combat.289 A successful labeling program could

283. For a discussion of the advantages of labeling programs, see supra Part
II.C.
284. The Thai Cigarettes panel held that labeling programs are consistent
with Art. III:4 so long as the regulations and restrictions placed on imported
products treat the latter no less favorably than like products of national origin. See Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 75. Therefore, it stands to
reason that, if the requirements of a labeling program are applied equally to
imported products and products of national origin, the labeling program requirements are consistent under Art. III:4.
285. A reasonably alternative measure is one that can achieve the same
objective as the challenged measure, but is consistent or less inconsistent with
the GATT (and hence less restrictive). See Asbestos Panel Report, supra note
195, para. 3.318.
286. See Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195, para. 169 (citing Gasoline
Case, supra note 120).
287. Id.
288. Id. para. 172 (citing Korea Beef Dispute, supra note 214).
289. Id. para. 174.
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surely act as a least restrictive alternative in many circumstances; recent panel and Appellate Body decisions have established standards and qualifications for such acceptable labeling
programs.
1. The Labeling Program Must Be Effective
In order for the labeling program to be a reasonably available
alternative measure under Article XX, the label must be “effective,” which means it must be both informative and credible. In
the Thai Cigarettes dispute, the panel held that nondiscriminatory labeling and ingredient disclosure regulations were reasonably available least restrictive trade measures, making the
measures instituted by the Thai government overly restrictive
and therefore unnecessary.290 These alternative labeling regimes would not have been reasonable alternatives had they
failed to “contribute to the realization of the end pursued.”
However, the panel found that the labeling regulations were a
reasonably available alternative under Article XX because the
labeling and disclosure regulations were effective measures and
were used successfully by other countries to reduce smoking
and its harmful effects.291
In addition, it would be prudent to augment a labeling program’s effectiveness by coupling it with other successful measures. For example, the Thai Cigarettes panel suggested education,292 a ban on unhealthy substances,293 and a ban on advertising.294 However, such measures must apply to both foreign and
domestic products equally in order to meet the requirements of
Art. III:4.295 These supplemental steps will likely raise the effectiveness of a labeling program, thus helping it rise to the level
of an effective alternative measure.
Unfortunately, the threshold level of a label’s effectiveness
has not yet been established by a panel or an Appellate Body.296
290. Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 77.
291. Id.
292. Id. para. 80.
293. Id. para. 77.
294. Id. para. 78.
295. Id. para. 78 n.1.
296. With the exception of Thai Cigarettes, GATT/WTO panels have not
measured a label’s effectiveness. Although the label placed on tuna fish was
scrutinized in Tuna I, the issue in that case was whether the label was consis-
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But, the cases suggest that the required level of effectiveness
might be relatively low. For instance, in the Thai Cigarettes
dispute, the panel held that labels could be a reasonably available alternative under Art. XX, yet there was evidence that the
Thai government had already implemented non-discriminatory
controls including, inter alia, warnings on cigarettes packs.297
These controls were implemented prior to the establishment of
the challenged restrictive measures at issue in the dispute.298
Consequently, the panel did not investigate how effective the
non-discriminatory controls (i.e., the warnings on the cigarette
packs) must be to rise to the level of a reasonably available alternative. If so, the panel could have determined that the cigarette warnings, which arguably were ineffective, were not a reasonable alternative to the Thai Decree. Therefore, the required
level of a labeling program’s effectiveness may not be relatively
high. However, in the Thai Cigarettes dispute, there was also
evidence presented by WHO which suggested that labeling programs, coupled with other measures, could be effective in reducing the harmful effects of tobacco use.299
The EC Asbestos dispute stands for the proposition that the
effectiveness of the alternative measure must be real and not
just a mere possibility. Both the panel and the Appellate Body
held that controlled use, which would include a labeling program, would not meet the goal sought by the French Decree.
Taken together, the decisions in the Thai Cigarettes and EC
Asbestos disputes may stand for the proposition that although
the alternative trade restriction does not have to be completely
effective, it must be reasonably effective. Moreover, simply because controlled use was not an available alternative to the
French decree, it does not automatically follow that the French
Decree was the least restrictive measure.
At first glance, the EC Asbestos decision may be seen as a
limitation to both labels and the notion of controlled use. Many
observers could conclude that the panel and Appellate Body decided as they did because asbestos is simply too dangerous for a

tent with Art. I:1 of the GATT, not whether it was a reasonably available alternative measure under Art. XX. See Tuna I, supra note 127, para 5.43.
297. Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 78.
298. Id.
299. Id. para. 56.
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controlled use program. However, this reason misses the important point that for a label to be effective it must reach the
end user or persons at risk. This requirement is especially true
in situations where the label serves as a warning rather than as
a simple information source. Therefore, a labeling program
would not work in situations where the label or warning is not
read or observed by the end user of the product. For example, a
label placed on commercial food might not be effective. Suppose
that the production of truffle oil involved socially unfriendly or
unsafe procedures. The label on the bottle explaining such procedures should notify those who keep truffle oil at home. However, most people experience the enjoyment of truffle oil while
dining at restaurants, and a label on the bottle of truffle oil at a
fancy restaurant would not reach the consumer at table six.
Likewise, a label on the fertilizer bag used to treat a soccer field
would not serve as a warning for the players but would only
alert the groundskeeper. However, sometimes the strategic
placing of the label would cure this problem. For instance, the
groundskeeper of the soccer field might place a sign on the sidelines of the field, thus alerting end users of the danger. Of
course, the effectiveness of the label or labeling program not
only augments the program’s ability to satisfy the requirements
set forth by the discussed cases, it also increases the chances of
satisfying its paramount goal, i.e., the promotion of healthy,
environmentally-friendly, or socially-conscious products.
2. The Importance of International Support or Agreement
International support, agreement, or evidence of international negotiations should increase the legitimacy of a labeling
program, thereby increasing its effectiveness.
However,
GATT/WTO panels and Appellate Bodies have also suggested
that such a feature may actually be a requirement for a measure requiring an Article XX defense. For example, the Tuna I
panel required the United States to first exhaust all options
reasonably available to it before seeking to invoke an Article XX
exception. In particular, the panel looked to see if the United
States had entered into any negotiations or international cooperative arrangements.300 Therefore, international agreement or
300. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 5.28.
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negotiations may be required or, at the very least, considered
an important element to any proposed labeling program.
International acceptance of the measure was also investigated in the Thai Cigarettes dispute, where the regulatory programs instituted by other Members clearly influenced the
panel’s decision.301 Additionally, the recommendation of the
WHO was given great weight by the panel.302 Similarly, in the
Shrimp Turtle dispute, the Appellate Body’s decision was influenced by the fact that the United States did not engage in any
“across-the-board negotiations” before enforcing their restrictive
provision;303 instead, the Appellate Body found that the negotiations were impermissibly selective because the United States
negotiated seriously with some countries and not with others.304
The Appellate Body concluded that “[e]nvironmental measures
addressing transboundary or global environmental problems
should, as far as possible, be based on international consensus.”305
At the very least, the above decisions may require acceptance
of a labeling program’s effectiveness on an international level.
It is important to emphasize that a labeling program must be
reasonably effective and available to be the least restrictive
trade measure. If the labeling program is time-tested in other
countries or is recommended by international organizations,
then it is more likely to be found a reasonably effective alternative measure. However, it is questionable under these disputes
whether labeling programs that are new and untested will meet
the requirements of being reasonably effective.
3. The Labeling Program Must be Fair
A labeling program instituted by one trading Member must
be fair to all other trading Members. A labeling program must
be fair because, as the Appellate Body in the Shrimp Turtle dispute concluded, under the chapeau of Article XX “a balance
must be struck between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty of that same Member to
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 77.
See id. para. 56.
Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129, para. 166.
Id. para. 172.
Id. para. 168.
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respect the treaty rights of other Members.”306 Further, the Appellate Body held that although it might be acceptable for a
government in establishing its domestic policy to adopt a single
standard, it is not acceptable with regard to international trade
“for one WTO Member ... to require other Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program, to
achieve a certain policy goal...without taking into consideration
different conditions, which may occur in the territories of those
other Members.”307
Therefore, the Shrimp Turtle decision may require the Member instituting the labeling program to consider the capabilities
of developing nations. The requirements of a labeling program
cannot be unattainable to other Members such that compliance
would be impossible and, in effect, would result in a trade ban
on the products of that country. This requirement is consistent
with Article III:4, which provides that a Member can regulate
the products bought and sold in its territory; however, foreign
and domestic goods, which are considered alike, must be treated
similarly.308 The real issue, which is beyond the scope of this
Article, is how far this requirement should be taken. It is relatively simple to imagine a situation where a surmountable requirement for a product in a developed nation could seem impossible for a developing nation to implement.309 It is unclear
whether such a situation would inhibit the formulation of a labeling requirement. Although industry is far more sophisticated in a developed nation, it seems unlikely that the requirement of a label on a product would be considered too great a
burden on a developing nation.
However, if the label requires certain content, then the program may be seen as a disguised restriction on trade and, thus,
impermissible. However, in such a situation the issue would
likely be addressed when applying the chapeau. In other words,
306. Id. para. 156.
307. Id. para. 164.
308. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. III:4.
309. For example, one trading Member may require that if a product does
not contain an ingredient that can only be obtained through a domestic producer for an economically unfeasible amount, then the product’s label must
read “Obnoxious Waste” or “The Modern Day Lead Paint.” Such a requirement would make it impossible for the producer to meet the requirement and
the label would destroy the hope of selling any of the product in that country.
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the challenge would be that the label is a disguised restriction
or trade barrier because the label requires that the product itself meet certain qualifications. Such a requirement, however,
is entirely different than simply requiring a label with the sole
purpose of conveying information.
The Tuna I panel held that a labeling program possessing
certain attributes complies with the GATT Agreement. Yet, the
role labeling programs play in international law is incomplete.
More specifically, labeling programs could develop into a default
least restrictive trade measure to other challenged trade restrictions. The existence, or potential existence, of a labeling
program may provide an attacking Member with additional arguments to challenge other restrictive trade measures. Any
given attacking Member could argue that most, if not all, restrictive trade measures fall short of satisfying the “necessary
requirement” under Art. XX due to the existence of the least
restrictive alternative labeling program.
Therefore, a defending Member may be forced to defend its
trade restriction under not only the GATT, but also from the
argument that an existing or obtainable labeling program, as
the least restrictive measure, should be implemented in its
stead. As such, labeling programs could act as “catchall” least
restrictive trade measures under WTO jurisprudence. Such an
opportunity was present and successfully raised by the United
States in the Thai Cigarettes dispute.
The increased use of labeling programs in international trade
will support such arguments in the future. In turn, future
WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions that support the use
of labeling programs will sustain the use and international acceptance of labeling programs in general. Consequently, it is
imperative that labeling programs incorporate the required attributes set forth by the aforementioned cases. Hence, labeling
programs should diligently implement all steps necessary to
ensure that the program is effective, international support or
agreement of its effectiveness and relevance exists, and its requirements are fair. Prospective WTO decisions supporting the
use of labeling programs will only increase the clout of such
programs, hopefully resulting in decreased environmental damage and human health risks.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The development and use of labeling programs in international trade is rapidly increasing. These programs have many
advantages and some disadvantages. In the near future, labeling programs may change the face of Article XX analysis in the
WTO. Disputes involving labeling programs are increasing in
stature and frequency in the WTO dispute panels. A Member
seeking to defend a challenged restriction under Article XX
may, at some point in the future, be required to defend its restriction both from the challenge of the attacking Member and
from the argument that a labeling program would be a reasonably available alternative measure. This contention would be
especially true if the labeling program was found to be effective,
agreeable to the international community or accepted in an international agreement, and reasonably fair to all trading members.

